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ABSTRACT
Social media has become a primary platform for real-time information sharing
among users. News on social media spreads faster than traditional outlets and millions
of users turn to this platform to receive the latest updates on major events especially
disasters. Social media bridges the gap between the people who are affected by
disasters, volunteers who offer contributions, and first responders. On the other hand,
social media is a fertile ground for malicious users who purposefully disturb the relief
processes facilitated on social media. These malicious users take advantage of social
bots to overrun social media posts with fake images, rumors, and false information.
This process causes distress and prevents actionable information from reaching the
affected people. Social bots are automated accounts that are controlled by a malicious
user and these bots have become prevalent on social media in recent years.
In spite of existing efforts towards understanding and removing bots on social
media, there are at least two drawbacks associated with the current bot detection
algorithms: general-purpose bot detection methods are designed to be conservative
and not label a user as a bot unless the algorithm is highly confident and they overlook
the effect of users who are manipulated by bots and (unintentionally) spread their
content. This study is trifold. First, I design a Machine Learning model that uses
content and context of social media posts to detect actionable ones among them;
it specifically focuses on tweets in which people ask for help after major disasters.
Second, I focus on bots who can be a facilitator of malicious content spreading during
disasters. I propose two methods for detecting bots on social media with a focus on
the recall of the detection. Third, I study the characteristics of users who spread the
content of malicious actors. These features have the potential to improve methods
that detect malicious content such as fake news.
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Chapter 1
INTROCUDTION
Using social media to reflect on disasters goes back to September 11th, 2001 (the
9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon), when
the families of affected people used wikis to collect information on the missing peo-
ple. Additionally, FEMA and Red Cross used web technologies to inform people with
status updates (Palen and Liu, 2007). Since then, there have not been any major
disaster that was not widely reflected on social media (see Figure 1.1 for major events
since 2011). During the destructive Haiti Earthquake, 2010, US government agen-
cies used social media technologies as the main knowledge sharing medium between
themselves, the government of Haiti, and the United Nations (Yates and Paquette,
2010). During Hurricane Sandy, 2012, more than twenty million tweets were pub-
lished (Gupta et al., 2013) and citizens handled activities that were unlikely to be
done by official emergency responders such as recovering lost animals (White et al.,
2014). In the course of Hurricane Harvey, 2017, victims turned to social media to call
for help. They used hashtags such #SOSHarvey and #helphouston to ask for rescuers
and volunteers compiled a list of names and addresses on social media to respond to
these cries for help. Devastation of victims shown in some of the social media posts
resulted in thousands of re-shares and this made rescuing these victims a top priority
for rescuers1.
Social media provides a platform for emergency responders to acquire situational
awareness through the content shared by the users who act as social sensors (Sakaki
et al., 2010). This awarness is in the form of a big picture of the event or actionable
1http://time.com/4921961/hurricane-harvey-twitter-facebook-social-media/
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Figure 1.1: Major Disasters That Have Been Widely Reflected on Social Media
Since the 9/11 Attacks in 2011.
insights (Castillo, 2016). Preliminary assessment of a disaster such as the area which
was affected, the number of casualties, and the failed infrastructures are obtained in
the “big picture”. “Actionable insights” entail more details such as requests for re-
sources such as water, gas, and electricity. Many systems have been developed to ben-
efit and organize the content and volunteer efforts on social media. Ushahidi (Okolloh,
2009) is the first large-scale crowdsourcing system for data collection, visualization,
and filtering in disaster relief. OpenStreetMap is one of the systems that allows vol-
unteers contribute in generating open source maps by marking entities such as roads
and buildings. These maps have been used for disasters such as Haiti earthquake,
2010 (Zook et al., 2010). Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response (AIDR) (Imran
et al., 2014) is another system that can be trained on a small sample of labeled tweets
to detect tweets related to categories such as shelter and food. TweetTracker (Kumar
et al., 2011) is a system built at Arizona State University for tracking, analyzing, and
understanding tweets related to a specific topic.
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Figure 1.2: Interactions on Social Media. Both Benign and Malicious Users Gener-
ate Content (Tweet) and Share the Content of Others (Retweet). Our Focus Is Mali-
cious Content (Red Tweets in the Figure), Malicious Actors (Red Users), and Benign
Users Who Spread the Content of Malicious Actors (Green Users Who Tweet/Retweet
Red Tweets).
Achieving situational awareness through the lens of social media is valuable but
challenging. One challenge is that disaster related posts are indulged in huge number
of irrelevant posts such as donation scams, fake news, and rumors. This issue has
become more pronounced since bots have been used to facilitate the spread of these
malicious content. In June 2014, 8.5% of all accounts used third-party applications to
automate their activities on Twitter. However, this number is increasing as a study in
2017 estimated that between 9% and 15% of Twitter users are bots (Varol et al., 2016).
Bots change how information diffuses on social media; they accelerate the spread of
rumors and increase the number of people exposed to rumors by 26% (Vosoughi et al.,
2018).
The second challenge is neutralizing the effect of social media users who (mostly
unintentionally) boost the effect of malicious actors such as bots. A goal of exploiting
3
facilitators such as bots is increasing the reach of some target content. This goal
is not achieved unless some of the social media users participate in the diffusion
process. Hence, it is important to understand who these users are (their features
and characteristics) and what motivates them to spread such content. A deeper
understanding of these users sheds light on the factors contributing to the spread of
malicious content and approaches this problem from a new angle.
In this work, we focus on three aspects of social media interactions in course of
disasters, as shown in Fig.1.2. First, we study the content that becomes available
and how we can extract actionable insights from them. Second, we explore the role
of malicious actors, such as bots, on social media and how we can detect them.
Third, we examine the users who help spread the content of malicious actors, their
characteristics, and motivations.
1.1 Social Media for Disaster Response
In this section, we provide specific examples of how machine learning systems
empowered by social media have been used in disaster relief and response.
• Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) is a non-governmental organiza-
tion that helps generate maps of disastrous locations by indicating damaged and
intact buildings, blocked and open roads, and the locations of key infrastructure
such as hospitals. HOT was used in large scale during the Haiti Earthquake,
2010, and Typhoon Haiyan, 2013, to generate and continually update the maps
of affected areas . HOT was officially tasked by UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and the Philippine Red Cross before
the landfall. During the typhoon, UNOCHA and also a medical aid group
Médecins Sans Frontières (also known as Doctors Without Borders) used the
maps generated by volunteers in HOT (Butler, 2013). Moreover, UN Volunteers
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(UNV) posted opportunities for online volunteers to geotag Twitter messages
and images from the affected area to map urgent needs of the population (Bonn,
2013).
• Standby Task Force is digital volunteering organization that was set up in 2010
and incorporated as a not for profit in 2014. This organization has been involved
in relief and response efforts during disasters such as Hurricanes Matthew, Har-
vey, Irma, and Maria and the 2015 Nepal Earthquake. Standby Task Force
provides crisis maps that have overlays of requests for assistance and dam-
age reports. To generate these maps, social media posts and reports from
local and national communities are collected, filtered, and categorized then ver-
ified and geo-tagged by volunteers on the map. Crisis maps generated by this
organization were used by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
during Hurricane Maria providing the status of hospitals and roads in Puerto
Rico (Proctor and Dalchand, 2017); supported the United States Coast Guard
in the search and rescue efforts during Hurricane Irma (Proctor, 2017); collab-
orated with Humanity Road during the 2015 Nepal Earthquake by deploying
near real-time maps of the disaster that benefited from Artificial Intelligence
for Disaster Response (AIDR) (Imran et al., 2014); filtered social media posts
and community reports (Proctor, 2015).
• Humanity Road (HR) is a nonprofit organization formed in 2010 to help with
the disaster response efforts through “social listening”. This organization is one
of the seven companies that were recognized by the FEMA Tech Sector in the
Tech Corps program2 which is a nationwide program of skilled technology vol-
2https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2015/06/17/fema-launches-innovative-national-volunteer-
program-enhance-disaster
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unteers who help complement the tech aspect of the relief efforts3. Technology
organizations in the Tech Corps help federal, state, local and tribal governments
incorporate innovative technologies in disaster relief and response. This organi-
zation has assisted with several disasters such as the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, the
2016 Kumamoto Earthquake in Japan, 2018 Woolsey Fire, and Hurricanes Har-
vey, Irma, Maria, and Michael. During the Nepal Earthquake, HR volunteers
data mined social media posts to find urgent needs and situational awareness
information. Moreover, HR exploited machine learning tools such as Scanigo 4
to reduce the size of the social media dataset by removing irrelevant information
in order to extract situational information from tweets; in this process, Scanigo
filtered 1.2 million Nepal related tweets to just 4,638 which drastically reduced
the human annotation effort required. Humanity Road also collaborated with
the Data Mining and machine learning Lab at Arizona State University to ex-
amine the opportunities and challenges in using social media data for disaster
repose (Abbasi et al., 2012).
• Kathmandu Living Labs (KLL) is a Nepali-based nonprofit technology company
focused on open-source mapping founded in 2013. This organization benefits
from up to 2,400 volunteers per day during disasters who use social media, satel-
lite imaging, and observation reports to generate maps of the area hit by disas-
ter. KLL started with detailed mapping of the Kathmandu Valley and expanded
their efforts during the 2015 Nepal Earthquake by project QuakeMap.org. In
this project, information is collected using the required resources about the af-
fected people with their locations and road blocks. Misplaced people were then
3https://www.humanityroad.org/our-blog/humanity-road-joins-fema-tech-corps
4https://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/833717
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added to the maps5. These maps were used by the Red Cross and the Nepali
Army during the Nepal Earthquake (Sinha, 2015).
1.2 Bots in the Course of Disasters
Bots, during the natural disasters of 2017, Mexico Earthquake and Hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, used disaster-related hashtags to promote political topics
such as #DACA and #BlackLivesMatter (Khaund et al., 2018). These bots change
the network structure by forming clusters that are different from ones formed by
the connections between human users. Bots form large clusters with dense cores
consisting of bots and loose connections to humans. Human formed clusters, on the
other hand, are smaller in size but more tightly knit. They also share fake news such
as the hoax story of shark swimming on the streets after Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.
News related to natural and man-made disasters (such as terrorism and war) are
the seventh and third most prominent topics among all news topics spread on Twitter
from 2006 and 2017. In a study on the effect of bots on the spread of these topics
(Vosoughi et al., 2018), the researchers observed that bots drastically change the
dynamics of diffusion. Bots accelerate the spread of rumors and increase the number
users exposed to them by about 26%. Bots also change the structure of diffusion
cascades by increasing their depth by 21% and maximum breadth by 26%.
In another work (Abokhodair et al., 2015), a botnet that was active during the
Syrian civil war in 2012 was studied. These bots used two tactics to sway away the
attention from the discussions on civil war: misdirection and smoke screening. In
misdirection, bots tweeted about political and natural crisis happening worldwide
while including keywords related to the Syrian civil war to point attention from it.
In smoke screening, bots talked about other events in Syria using relevant hashags
5http://www.kathmandulivinglabs.org/projects/quakemaporg
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#syria (in English and Arabic) but the content was not about the civil war. Both
misdirection and smoke screening tweets can shift the attention of users from the
Syrian civil wars if tweeted in large numbers. Bots in this study remained active
more than 6 months while having major differences from human users. For instance,
they tweeted up to 5,733 tweets per week (one tweet in about 1.8 minutes), mainly
tweeted about news (52.6%), as opposed to humans, and did not express personal
opinion.
More than 11,000 users posted about Paris Attacks and Umpqua Community
College Shootings in Fall 2015 on Twitter. Researchers (Nied et al., 2017) formed the
network of these users by establishing a link between every two users if they shared at
least 5% of their network. Of the clusters found in this network, three botnet clusters
were detected. These bots, although consisting of 10% of users (150 bots), generated
more than one third of all the tweets. These bots spread alternative narratives. The
prominent alternative narrative about the Umpque shooting was an image meme of
four pictures of people from different crisis events who looked similar, asserting that
they were the same person, a ”crisis actor” hired by the government to stage the
event. For the Paris attacks, bots spread the alternative narrative that the French
government was staging false evidence to blame the Syrian refugees for this disaster.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter we introduce the previous research on the topic of this dissertation.
We will discuss the background on the problem of bot detection on social media in
the first half of this chapter. The topics in this part help the readers understand the
importance of studying bots on social media, categories of bots and their intents, and
the methods proposed to detect bots. In the second half, we discuss how disasters
are reflected on social media, the potential applications of social media for disaster
response, and the systems developed towards this goal.
2.1 Prevalence of Bots on Social Media
Existence of large number of bots on social media and specially Twitter has been
reported by multiple sources. In 2013, Twitter announced that about 5% of its users
are fake (Elder, 2013). The Wall Street Journal reported (Koh, 2014) in March
2014 that half of the accounts created in 2014 were suspended by Twitter due to
activities such as aggressive following and unfollowing behaviors which are known
characteristics of bots (Lee et al., 2011). In 2017, Varol et al. reported that between
9% to 15% of users on Twitter exhibit bot behaviors (Varol et al., 2016). In 2018,
Twitter suspended 70 million accounts (Timberg and Dwoskin, 2018) in an effort
towards fighting fake news and suspicious accounts. This mass removal happened
after the congressional pressure on social media companies to prevent harmful acts
of organized fake accounts that affected the US presidential election in 2016 (Jane,
2016). This swarm of bots rising on social media have wide range of malicious effects.
An extensive list of news articles on bots in major event is presented in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: News Articles on Bots on Social Media During Major Events.
Outlet Category Event Data Source
The Guardian1 Elections US Presidential Election 2016 Twitter
Time Magazine2 Elections US Presidential Election 2016 NBER
Bloomberg3 Elections Italian General Election 2018 Atlantic Council
The Telegraph4 Referendum Brexit Twitter
Politico Magazine5 Propaganda #ReleaseTheMemo Movement 2018 -
The Guardian6 Propaganda Russia-Ukraine Conflict 2014 -
CNN7 Propaganda Jamal Khashoggi’s Death 2018 Atlantic Council
The Telegraph8 Fake News Stock Market - FTSE 100 Index 2018 -
Forbes9 Ad Fraud AFK13 Attack White Ops Firm
The New York Times10 Mass Shooting Florida School Shooting 2018 New Knowledge Co.
Fox News11 Mass Shooting Texas School Shooting 2018 Bot Sentinel Co.
The Telegraph12 Terrorist Attack Westminster Terror Attack 2017 -
Medium13 Natural Disasters Mexico City Earthquake 2017 -
Bots remain active for a long time and affect a large number of users. In an
experiment, researchers (Freitas et al., 2015) created a set of 120 Twitter bots.
These bots targeted different groups of users (in terms of diversity and how well
they were connected) and could gain 4,999 follows from 1,952 distinct users, and
2,128 message-based interactions from 1,187 distinct users while 69% of these bots
could not be detected by Twitter in 30 days. In an study of the 2010 US midterm
elections on Twitter (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011b), authors observed that a group of
bots smearing Chris Coons, the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate from Delaware
by promoting specific URLs. These bots further targeted popular users who were
active on the topic and mentioned them in their promotional tweets. When targeted
users receive the same content from multiple sources the probability of involving in
the cascade increases (Hasher et al., 1977). Another example of political content
promotion happened during the US presidential election in 2016. Bots produced 1.7
billion tweets and successfully deviated the discussion by outnumbering the tweets
supporting one candidate by the factor of four (Kelion and Silva, 2016); millions
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of fake stories supporting each candidate were shared on Facebook and again the
balance is 4 to 1 supporting the same candidate (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). These
findings raise the question whether fake news did (Jane, 2016) or did not (Allcott and
Gentzkow, 2017) affect the election results.
2.2 Malicious Versus Benign Bots
Bots on social media have both positive and negative impact. Malicious bots
are intentionally exploited to perform harmful activities on social media. Malicious
bots sway the discussions (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011a,b; Thomas et al., 2012) and cause
users to lose trust that social media platforms can deliver news honestly. Major
search engines take social media into account when ranking the webpages on the
results pages; more popularity on social media causes a company to appear higher
in the search results. Researchers argue that some companies exploit fake likes and
fake followers to increase their revenue (Clark, 2015). Furthermore, bots impinge the
work researchers perform on social media as they can draw false conclusions about the
populations under study. Researchers wish to understand human behavior through
the lens of social media (Mejova et al., 2015), and this is often impinged by the wealth
of content pollution created by automated social media accounts (Wu et al., 2017).
Benign bots, on the other hand, help users automate consuming and broadcast-
ing information. These bots have benevolent purposes, self-declare as bots, and do
not disguise themselves among human users. @BBCWeatherBot, @earthquakesLA,
@big_ben_clock are examples of benign bots that broadcast weather, earthquakes
in Los Angeles, CA, and announce time on the hour respectively. Moreover, celebri-
ties, political figures, and businesses also use bots to publish content and respond to
customers’ questions. Frankfort Airport flight information bot, @FRA_Flightinfo,
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and Spirit Airline Twitter account, @SpiritAirlines use bots to post real-time flight
information and automatically reply to customer’s comments.
2.3 Categories of Malicious Bots
Lee et al. (Lee et al., 2010) studied social spammers on Twitter and found that
a large portion of these spammers were bots. They observed five categories among
these malicious users. Duplicate Spammers post almost identical tweets promoting a
message. They use the mention (i.e @username mechanism to target specific Twitter
users. Pornographic Spammers have graphical profiles or post adult content. Promot-
ers increase the visibility of marketing messages and advertise businesses. However,
they mix their message with innocuous tweets to disguise among benign users. These
bots latch trending hashtags to their messages to push them higher in the social media
search results. One example is using disaster-related hashtags to promote political
content in during the hurricanes in 2017 (Khaund et al., 2018). The effect of Promot-
ers has been also observed in political content promotion. In an study of the 2010
US midterm elections on Twitter (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011b), authors observed that a
group of bots smearing Chris Coons, the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate from
Delaware by promoting specific URLs. These bots further targeted popular users who
were active on the topic and mentioned them in their promotional tweets. Another
example of political content promotion happened during the US presidential election
in 2016. Bots produced 1.7 billion tweets and successfully deviated the discussion
by outnumbering the tweets supporting one candidate by the factor of four (Kelion
and Silva, 2016); millions of fake stories supporting each candidate were shared on
Facebook and again the ratio was 4 to 1 supporting the same candidate (Allcott and
Gentzkow, 2017). These findings raise the question whether fake news did (Jane,
2016) or did not (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) affect the election results. Phishers
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deliver phishing URLs to targeted users. Friend Infiltrators actively connect to other
users on social media hoping that they reciprocate as courtesy and remove the links
if they do not. Note that aggressive following behavior is against Twitter’s rules and
policies14. Friend Infiltrators seek followers to form a large network for spreading
their messages and increasing the popularity of specific social media figures. Having
large number of followers and balancing the number of followers and friends help ma-
licious bots blend in among human users (Lee et al., 2011). There are many services
that sell fake followers such as buycheapfollowerslikes.org and audiencegain.com for
cheap prices. The New York Times reported on July 13, 2018, after Twitter removed
millions of suspicious users, known as the Twitter purge, many popular figures lost
thousands of their followers. Celebrities, political figures, and world leaders observed
a decrease in their followers up to 6%, many of which possible to be bots (Harris
et al., 2018).
In another categorization (Subrahmanian et al., 2016), bots are categorized into
three groups: spambots, paybots, and influence bots. Spambots spread irrelevant and
or inappropriate spam tweets. Twitter’s definition of spamming includes activities
such as posting links to phishing and malware sites, creating multiple accounts, and
aggressive follow behaviors15. Paybots perform illegitimate activities in an attempt
to gain financial profit. For example, they follow political figures and celebrities to
boost their popularity and increase their influence on social media (Harris et al.,
2018). Influence bots impact users active on and conversations about specific topics.
Influence bots during the 2016 US presidential election where used to tweet about one
candidate and this activity changed the statistics of discussions about that candidate
on Twitter by the factor of four (Kelion and Silva, 2016).
14https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-spam
15https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-spam
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2.4 Characteristics of Malicious Bots
Bots are different from human users in their profile, activities, and connections.
Here we enumerate a set of characteristics of malicious social bots.
• Content of posts and messages: Bots tend to use more URLs in their posts
for promotional purposes (Xie et al., 2008). Sentiment of tweets (Ratkiewicz
et al., 2011b,a), language and length of messages (Thonnard and Dacier, 2011),
number of mentions and similarity between all pairs of tweets by a user (Lee
et al., 2011), and originality of tweets (Wang, 2010) can all differentiate bots
from humans.
• Profiles and activities: Automation involved in generating bot accounts results
in profiles that contain detectable patterns. Bots that were working together
towards political disruption in the 2011 Russian parliamentary election were
found to have similar email addresses and account creation times (Thomas
et al., 2012).
Bots have a shorter life time (Lee et al., 2011), short subscriber details (Cook
et al., 2014), and use hijacked IP addresses (Thomas et al., 2012). A bot
master would also spread the machines from which he launches his attacks
geographically (Kanich et al., 2008).
Even when profile information is not available, the username alone can be a bot
indicator. The length of the screen name (Lee et al., 2011) and the distance
between the distribution of n-grams extracted from verified names and bot
names (Lee and Kim, 2014) can differentiate bots from normal users. Matching
how well the screen name matches human typing patterns can also discriminate
automated users (Zafarani and Liu, 2015).
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Figure 2.1: A Taxonomy of Bot Detection Methods.
• Network structure and connections: To boost their desired effect, Twitter bots
follow normal users hoping to be followed back. To this aim, they exhibit mass
follow and unfollow behaviors and thus their connections show different char-
acteristics. The number of followers, number of friends, ratio of the the friends
to followers, percentage of bidirectional friends, and the standard deviation of
unique numerical IDs of followers and friends have been used to detect bots (Lee
et al., 2011).
2.5 Bot Detection Models
The prevalence of bots on social media has encouraged researchers to propose
combating methods. There are two categories of methods proposed for bot detection
on social media: supervised and unsupervised (shown in Figure 2.1). Supervised
methods proved to be effective but require reliable ground-truth datasets for training.
Unsupervised methods for bot detection rise to this challenge and propose ideas to
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use unique universal characteristics of human users or the similarity between groups
of users to discriminate bots from human users. In this work we introduce some
of state-of-the-art unsupervised bot detection methods that are proposed in recent
years, categorize them, and mention some of the challenges they face.
Researchers have studied bots on social media during numerous major events such
as natural disasters, man-made disasters such as Syrian civil war and mass shootings,
and political events such as US Presidential Election or referendums in other countries.
An extensive list of such research papers is presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Activity Areas of Bots on Twitter
Reference #Tweets #Users #Bots Event
(Khaund et al., 2018) 1,219,454 776,702 10016 Natural disasters
(Vosoughi et al., 2018) 4.5M 3M 396K Natural Disasters17
(Abokhodair et al., 2015) 150K - - Syrian civil war
(Starbird, 2017) 77,461 15,150 2,696 Mass Shootings
(Nied et al., 2017) 32K 11K 1.1K Paris Attacks
(Kitzie et al., 2018) 36,62718 120K 6,051 Parkland shooting 2018
(Shao et al., 2017) 11,656 915 54 Low-credibility Content
(Bessi and Ferrara, 2016) 12.6 50K 7,183 US Presidential Election 2016
(Shao et al., 2018b) 27,648,423 630,368 - US Presidential Election 2016
(Shao et al., 2018a) 13,617,425 - - US Presidential Election 2016
(Stella et al., 2018) 3.6M 523K 174K Catalan referendum 2017
(Broniatowski et al., 2018) 9,845 8,289 190 Vaccine Debate
(Allem et al., 2017) 412,816 365,490 - E-Cigarette Discussions
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2.5.1 Supervised Methods
Ferrara et al. (Ferrara et al., 2016) proposed a taxonomy of bot detection models
which divides them into three classes: (1) graph-based, (2) crowdsourcing, and (3)
feature-based social bot detection methods.
• Graph-based Methods
Graph-based social bot detection models lie on the assumption that the con-
nectivity of bots is different from human users on social media. SybilRank (Cao
et al., 2012) is a graph-based method proposed to efficiently detect adversary-
owned bot accounts based on the links they form. The underlying assumption
is that bots are mostly connected to other bots and have limited number of
links to human users. Hence, if we start short random walks from a set of
trusted users in the network, there is a higher probability that we land on a
human user rather than a bot. Bots also show different characteristics in the
communities they form. In a study on the bots that were active during the
natural disasters in 2017, Khaund et al. (Khaund et al., 2018) observed that
bots form more hierarchical communities with cores of bots strongly connected
to each other and peripheral members who are weakly connected to the core
and to each other. Moreover, human users had more communities and their
communities were more tightly knit.
• Crowdsourcing Methods
Crowdsourcing social bot detection uses human annotators, expert and hire
workers, to label social media users as human or bot (Wang et al., 2013). This
method is reliable and has near zero error when the inter annotator agreement
is considered. However, it is time consuming, not cost effective, and not feasible
considering millions of users on social media. Crowdsourcing and manual anno-
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tation are still being used as methods for collecting gold standard datasets for
feature based bot detection models, most of which use supervised classification.
• Feature-based Methods
Feature based social bot detection methods are based on the observation that
bots have different characteristics than human users. To use feature-based
supervised bot detection models, one must identify differences among bot and
human users in terms of features such as content or activity in a labeled dataset.
Then, a classifier is trained on the features and labels to distinguish bots from
humans in an unobserved dataset. Different classification methods can be used
for this purpose such as Support Vector Machines (Morstatter et al., 2016), Ran-
dom Forests (Lee et al., 2011), and Neural Networks (Kudugunta and Ferrara,
2018). We describe some common user features below:
– Content: the measures in this category focus on the content shared by
users. Words, phrases (Varol et al., 2017), and topics (Morstatter et al.,
2016) of social media posts can be a strong indicator of bot activity. Also,
bots are motivated to persuade real users into visiting external sites oper-
ated by their controller, hence, share more URLs in comparison to human
users (Chu et al., 2012; Ratkiewicz et al., 2011a; Xie et al., 2008). Bots
are observed to lack originality in their tweets and have large ratio of
retweets/tweets (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011b).
– Activity Patterns: Bots tweet in a “bursty” nature (Chu et al., 2012;
Lee and Kim, 2014), publishing many tweets in a short time and being
inactive for a longer period of time. Bots also tend to have very regular
(e.g. tweeting every 10 minutes) or highly irregular (randomized lapse)
tweeting patterns over time (Zhang and Paxson, 2011).
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– Network Connections: bots connect to a large number of users hoping to
receive followers back but the majority of human users do not reciprocate.
Hence, bots tend to follow more users than follow them back (Chu et al.,
2012).
2.5.2 Unsupervised Methods
There are two categories of unsupervised methods for bot detection on social
media. In the first category bots are discovered based on the similarities they share
in botnets. The idea is that members of a botnet, as much as they try to camouflage,
share commonalities because to their common purpose, creator, actions, or content.
In the second category, the goal is uncovering individual bots. This goal is achieved
by extracting unique universal features of human users on social media in terms of
their activity patterns. For example, the irregularity in their tweeting behavior; users
are indifferent in the second-of-the-minute and minute-of-the-hourthey tweet at. We
enumerate some of the state-of-the-art methods in the remainder of this section.
• Group-based methods
Chavoshi (Chavoshi et al., 2009) et al. proposed a criteria based on which
groups of users whose activities are abnormally aligned are detected. They
estimate the probability that two or more users in a group of users tweet/retweet
in a window of w seconds from each other during an hour. They show that even
when users are very active (they tweet every 20 seconds), the probability that
two users have forty or more matching tweets in an hour is close to zero. They
use this criteria to find groups of users who have at least 40 tweets in an hour and
consider the users whose activities are highly correlated as bots. They evaluate
their method on a dataset of Twitter users by finding clusters of similar user
in every hour, merging them, and picking the top ten clusters for evaluation.
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They compared the 9,134 bot accounts discovered with five other bot detection
approaches including the Twitter suspension method and BotOMeter (Davis
et al., 2016) system. Twitter suspended 45% of the discovered bots in 12 weeks
and BotOMeter agrees on the 59% of the bots.
In an extension to their previous method, Chavoshi et al. (Chavoshi et al.,
2016) use a lag-sensitive hashing method to cluster the suspicious users and
find groups of bots based on the similarity of their activities over time. The
proposed systems is constructed using four modules: (1) the steam of tweets
is collected from the Twitter API using a set of keywords (2) users who have
more than one tweet in T hours are selected; using the number of tweets in each
second, a time series signal for each user is generated. (3) each signal is hashed
into 2w+1 hash indexes (4) using a hierarchical clustering method, users are
grouped based on a warped correlation distance measure; users who fall into
clusters are considered bots and the singletons are considered false positives;
clustering continues until the distance between the clusters to be merged is less
than a threshold. In step (3), a random signal r is selected as the base and w
is the maximum lag in the time series (two signals are similar if lagging one for
w or -w seconds generates the other). Then, the hashed version of an activity
signal is calculated as the cross-correlation between r and that signal. This
hashed signal is then lagged for w seconds in each direction to generate 2w+1
hashed versions of the original signal. The users that are selected for clustering
are the ones with more than w/4 occurrences in a hash bucket if that bucket
contains at least w/4 such users. The evaluation is similar to their previous
work.
One approach (Chen and Subramanian, 2018) exploits a clustering mechanism
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on users based on the shortened URLs they include in their tweets. This method
monitors all the tweets that contain a URL shortened by one of the most popu-
lar URL shortening services on Twitter. If a group with twenty or more Twitter
users all post the same shortened URL, that group is marked as suspicious. The
users in a suspicious group who mostly (60% of their 200 most recent tweets)
post the most frequent (top 3) tweets in that group form a botnet. After the
botnets are recognized, the authors further investigate the owners of the web-
pages that are pointed to by the shortened URLs in the botnets. If one email
address is associated with multiple botnets, those botnets are considered as a
spamming campaign. In another approach (Ahmed and Abulaish, 2013), three
groups of features are used in a clustering based method for detecting bot cam-
paigns: interaction features (number of Twitter followers or Facebook friends),
hashtagging (total number of hashtags and hashtagging rate of a profile), and
URLs features (total and unique URLs shared by a profile). Then a weighted
graph of users based on the similarity between every two users is generated and
is given as the input to a Markov clustering algorithm (Van Dongen, 2008).
Clusters that were discovered using this method act as advertisement cam-
paigns, hijack legitimate accounts for spamming purposes, and show the same
pattern of generating tweets.
Cresci et al. (Cresci et al., 2016) proposed a bio-inspired unsupervised method
for detecting bots on Twitter. Each user is represented by two DNA sequence,
one that encodes tweeting activity pattern (tweet, reply, or retweet) and an-
other one encoding content type (e.g. tweets with URLs or hashtags). Ordered
sequence of activities of each user is represented by these two DNA sequences.
They observed that the Longest Common Subsequence (LCS) of DNA sequences
in botnets is much larger than groups of legitimate users. In a dataset of bots
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mixed with legitimate users, plotting the LCS for groups of different size shows
breakpoints that indicate size of each group of botnet. In botnet groups, LCS
remains large even when we increase the group size.
• Individual-based methods
Both methods (Ahmed and Abulaish, 2013; Chen and Subramanian, 2018)
mentioned above are unsupervised methods designed for detecting malicious
botnets who are similar in terms of content or network. However, benign bots,
as opposed to malicious bots are mainly individual bots designed to provide a
service19. Hence, to discriminate benign and malicious bots we require unsuper-
vised methods with the capability to label users based on the activity patterns
as we expect benign bots to show automation characteristics.
Another approach (Zhang and Paxson, 2011) is based on the differences between
the activity patterns of humans and bots on social media. This study shows
that human users are indifferent towards the minute-of-the-hour and second-
of-the-minute that they tweet at. Hence, their tweeting timestamps appears
to be drawn from a uniformly random distribution across minute-of-the-hour
and second-of-the-minute. On the other hand, bot accounts’ timestamps were
observed to be either non-uniform or excessively uniform. Non-uniform patterns
happen when bots tweet at specified times or intervals leading the timestamps
to be concentrated at a specific minute-of-the-hour and second-of-the-minute.
Excessively uniform scenarios happen when bots use a fixed delay after each
tweet. This uniform pattern is too regular to be from humans. They test
uniformity of tweeting timestamps using χ2 test with 0.001 as threshold.
19Although there are bots that are controlled by the same organization such as Twitter bots that
belong to USGS and report earthquakes on different locations.
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The VolTime algorithm (Chino et al., 2017) is a generative model based on
the inter-arrival time and volume of activities. Action at time ti of a user is
presented using an event tuple (∆i, vi) showing the time between between this
action and the one on time ti−1 and the volume vi. Volume can be the length
in characters (for textual content) or duration (for phone calls) depending on
the dataset. Once actions of users are formulated, the expected dispersion of
all events is calculated. Dispersion in a set of events is the number of unique
events. For example, the multiset of events (1, 1), (1, 3), (1, 1) has dispersion
equal to 2. Finally, the users whose events’ multiset has low dispersion (using
a predefined threshold) are marked as bots.
BotWalk (Minnich et al., 2017) ensembles four unsupervised methods for de-
tecting bots. The authors generate a representation of each social media user
by four feature categories: metadata-, content-, temporal-, and network-based
features. Then, they ensemble the anomalous scores generated by four unsuper-
vised anomaly detection algorithms: density-, distance-, angle-, and isolation-
based methods. Anomalous sores generated by these four algorithms are scaled
using a Gaussian distribution to produce a probability p(x) between 0 and 1 of
the user x being an outlier. For the evaluation, they perform manually annota-
tions on a sample of detected bots and their features and compare the detected
bots with DeBot (Chavoshi et al., 2016) and BotORNot (Davis et al., 2016)
models.
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Chapter 3
EXTRACTING ACTIONABLE INFORMATION FROM SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media has become an important channel for crisis communication. Social media
is a fast-paced channel for people to describe their situation and observations, specify
their needs, and offer assistance; providing actionable information. Officials also use
social media in disaster response; for example, as shown in Figure 3.1, Red Cross asks
for donations using its Twitter account after major disasters.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Two Tweets of Red Cross Asking for Donation After Hurricanes Harvey
and Irma.
People connect via social networks after disasters to seek information (Palen and
Vieweg, 2008) and post their requests (Vieweg et al., 2010). This actionable infor-
mation is useful for first responders to better distribution resources when the size
and location of needs are unknown and the environment is uncertain and hard to
predict (Zeimpekis et al., 2013). One approach to help the posts with actionable
information stand out among millions of tweets, is taking advantage of hashtags. In
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the aftermath of the Chennai Rains in late November 2015, #ChennaiRainsHelp was
used by stranded people to request for help and by volunteers to offer accommoda-
tions (Joshi, 2015). After the Paris Attacks in November 2015, volunteers in the US
used #PorteOuverte (OpenDoor) and #StrandedInUS to offer a place to stay and
help the French people whose flights were canceled (Goel and Ember, 2015).
Although hashtags play an important role in finding the posts which contain
actionable information, not all such posts are marked with proper hashtags. In the
Boston Marathon Bombings in April 2013, no consistent hashtag was offered by official
organizations (Sutton et al., 2014). In such cases, valuable information is neglected
because of sole dependence on hashtags. A trivial way to overcome this issue is
manual inspection which is not feasible due to the large number of tweets flooding in.
These issues have encouraged the development of systems that automatically detect
actionable information and requests of the affected people.
Multiple systems have been developed to automate the process of extracting ac-
tionable information from user-generated (crowdsourced) data. One of the first large
scale attempts is Google Flu Trends in 2008. Based on the location and time of flu
related searches, Google predicted the outbreak of flu seven to ten days before the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Graham and Zook, 2011). Other systems
are Ushahidi (Okolloh, 2009), AIDR (Imran et al., 2014), and TweetTracker (Kumar
et al., 2011) that were discussed in Section 3.1.1.
Here, we focus on a subset of actionable information shared on social media which
needs immediate attention. More specifically, we propose a method to extract the
request for help on Twitter (we would call them requests in the remainder of this
section) by exploiting content and context of tweets. Our results show that context
(i.e. metadata of tweets) provides a powerful signal while it is easier to collect and
process.
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3.1 Disaster Response Using Social Media
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
defines disasters as sudden events that disrupt the functionality of a community such
that the losses go beyond the resources of that community 1. Disasters have eight
socio-temporal stages: Pre-disaster, Warning, Threat, Impact, Inventory, Rescue,
Remedy, and Recovery (Powell, 1954). The volume of social media posts varies in
each stage; majority of users start posting after the disaster onsets and the frequency
decreases when the disaster reaches its final stages. Availability of data is a major
factor in building automatic methods for facilitating disaster management and re-
sponse. Hence, we study four stages in disasters that are widely reflected on social
media and we have enough data for Machine Learning methods to achieve reliable
results: Warning, Impact, Response, and Recovery (see Figure 3.2).
In the warning stage, social media can be used as a complementary source of infor-
mation to help increase the confidence in predicting disasters and providing warnings.
Changes in the frequency of posts with specific words and topics, activity patterns
of users (Asur and Huberman, 2010; Sampson et al., 2015; Tumasjan et al., 2010),
and sentiment of posts (Mishne et al., 2006) are used to predict disasters. Predicting
disasters before they hit an area provides the opportunity to warn people in danger
and evacuate elevators and operation rooms. Currently, USGS uses tweets to check
the accuracy of sensor reports and detect earthquakes in a shorter time. Earthquakes
can be detected using tweets by 60 seconds earlier than sensors; this time is valuable
for warning areas in danger and starting evacuation processes (Ellis, 2015).
When disasters impact an area, social media posts show anomalies such as changes
1https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/what-is-a-
disaster/
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Figure 3.2: Socio-Temporal Stages of Disasters Which Are Reflected on Social Me-
dia.
in the language. A study (Cohn et al., 2004) on LiveJournal after 11 September
2001 shows that emotional positivity decreased and cognitive processing, social ori-
entation, and psychological distancing increased after the attack (Beigi et al., 2016).
These changes in social media posts can be quantitatively captured in sentence level
or topic level. Capturing the change in real-time results in detecting disasters be-
fore they are announced by official sources, governmental websites, or major news
outlets (SAMBULI, 2013).
In response to the chaotic environment caused by disasters, emergency responders
want to acquire actionable insight and a big picture of the disaster (Castillo, 2016).
Detecting and tracking topics, trends, and memes on social media provides informa-
tion regarding the status of disasters and the affected people. Damages, casualties,
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missing animals, and failed structures are some of the topics that people discuss on so-
cial media. Tracking these topics, discovering the trends, and monitoring mentioned
locations help responder distribute resources more efficiently .
Volunteers are significantly important in the relief process. They post informa-
tion that increases situational awareness (e.g. status of roads and damages to built
structures) and provide technical support for translating social media posts and geo-
tagging them. Some of the systems that exploit social media posts to facilitate disaster
management are Ushahidi (Okolloh, 2009), AIDR (Imran et al., 2014), and Tweet-
Tracker (Kumar et al., 2011).
3.1.1 Machine Learning Systems for Disaster Response
Social media is a unique platform for collaboration between remote volunteers.
These volunteers provide technical services such as translation, geolocating posts
on the map, and generating maps of the affected area. Several Machine Learning
tools have been developed to exploit crowdsourcing on social media for facilitating
volunteering actions during disasters.
Ushahidi
Ushahidi (Okolloh, 2009) is the first large-scale crowdsourcing system for disaster
relief. It has been initially developed to map the reports of Kenyan post-election vio-
lence in 2008 and since then has been used in many major disasters such as Hurricane
Sandy and Haiti Earthquake. Ushahidi is an open source and free systems which can
either be deployed on external servers or on Ushahidi’s hosting system CrowdMap.
When technical knowledge or hosting servers are not available, CrowdMap is a more
suitable.
Ushahidi has three main sections: data collection, visualization, and filtering. As
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the first step, disaster-related data is collected from several sources, web, Twitter,
RSS feeds, emails, SMS, and manual comma separated files. The user-contributed
information is then visualized on the map. Each point on the map shows one report
and when a user zooms out, aggregated number of reports in each area is represented.
As the last step, Ushahidi allows users to filter reports based on their types, e.g.
supplies or shelter. An snapshot of this system is shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: A Snapshot of Ushahidi System (Okolloh, 2009).
AIDR
Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response (AIDR) (Imran et al., 2014) is a free
software platform which can be either run as a web application or created as its own
instance. This system allows the detection of different categories of tweets based
on a small sample of labeled tweets. The process has three steps, data collection,
annotation, and classification. Tweets are collected based on a pre-selected set of
keywords. A small portion of theses tweets is then labeled by volunteers as in-category
or out-category. In each disaster, different categories can be considered such as status
update, shelter, or food. Labeled tweets which can be as few as 200, will be used
as the training set of a classifier which labels remaining set of tweets which were
collected based on the keywords. In the training process, n-grams of tweets are used
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as features and hence the classifier needs to be retrained for every new category and
disaster. The framework of this system is shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The Framework of AIDR (Imran et al., 2014)
TweetTracker
TweetTracker (Kumar et al., 2011) has been used by FEMA, The Red Cross, and
others during crisis scenarios. In TweetTracker, tweets which are related to a job are
crawled from Twitter Streaming API as they are published. Each job in TweetTracker
is defined to crawl the data related to an event from Twitter, Youtube, Vcontakte,
and/or Instagram. Each job is a collection of keywords, users (authors), and locations.
After creating a job, if a post is published on any of the selected social media sites
and matches any of the job’s criteria, it will be selected. A TweetTracker job for 2016
Japan earthquake in Kumamoto is shown in Fig. 3.5. When defining a new job for
the system, user can flag the job as being related to a natural or man-made crisis
such as an earthquake or a bombing. Tweets of the flagged jobs will be labeled with
the probability of being a request using the approach that is discussed in Section 3
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Figure 3.5: Job Creation in TweetTracker.
and the most probable ones will be show to the user. More details on TweetTracker
is available in Appendix A.
3.1.2 Relief Tasks Facilitated by Machine Learning
In this section, we present some of the disaster relief tasks that are facilitated by
Machine Learning techniques on the social media data.
Location Estimation
To overcome the challenge of location sparsity in social media data, several methods
have been proposed to estimate the location of posts or users. Content of posts,
activity characteristics, profiles, and networks of users are exploited to estimate the
location in which a user is based or the post is originated from. The granularity
of estimation differs from one method to another. Some approaches estimate the
coordinates, some remain in the city-level, and some only focus on a disaster areas
that can be limited to a neighborhood or expand to several cities or states.
Content is frequently used to estimate the origin of posts. N-grams and “crisis-
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sensitive” features such as “in” prepositional phrase (such as “in Boston”), existential
“there” (which usually describes an abstraction), and part-of-speech tag sequences
are signals that discriminate in-region posts from out-region ones in course of a dis-
aster (Morstatter et al., 2014). Moreover, posts from a disaster area are less likely
to include multiple hashtags, action words, and reference entities. Majority of such
posts are original and contain URLs (Kumar et al., 2014a). Posts from the same
location frequently use similar words (Cheng et al., 2010) and rarely use words that
are used in other locations (Han et al., 2013).
For locating users, the most intuitive features are geolocation or location field in
their profile, the location of the websites that they linked to (which can be obtained
using the IP or country code), time zone, and UTC24-Offset. These features can be
combined using the stacking method (Wolpert, 1992) by considering an importance
weight for each feature to find the most probable location of the user (Schulz et al.,
2013).
When location-indicating features are not available for a user, their location can be
estimated using the location of users surrounding them. Backstrom et al. (Backstrom
et al., 2010) observe that there is a power law relation between physical distance
and the probability of existing a social link. Based on this finding, they propose a
maximum likelihood prediction method that indicates the most probable location for
a user given its neighbors. Based on triadic closure, if user a is connected to users b
and c, b and c are more likely to be connected to each other (Kossinets and Watts,
2006). In “Triadic heuristic” (Jurgens, 2013), the location of users is estimated as the
geometric median of their neighbors who are in triadic closure with them. Moreover,
users are more likely to follow users nearby and more often mention the location in
which they live (Li et al., 2012).
Palen and Anderson (Palen and Anderson, 2016) introduce the concept of “con-
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textual streams” to combine Lexicon and location in order to overcome the issue of
incompleteness. They use a set of broad terms (such as “frankenstorm” and “sandy”
in the case of hurricane Sandy, 2012) to collect the first set of tweets. Then, they
find the users who have geolocated tweets from their desired location. Finally, they
collect their most recent 3,200 tweets and extend their previous dataset. Using this
information, they can compare the activities of users who are located on the site of
the disaster before, during, and after its occurrence.
Event Prediction
Social media has been used for predicting events that will happen in near future.
Forecasting the popularity of products, movie box-office, election results, and trends
in stock markets are examples of such predictions (Yu and Kak, 2012).
Prediction is based on features of social media posts. Increase in the number
of posts which are related to a topic (Asur and Huberman, 2010) can be indicator
of its future popularity. Changes in the patterns of using specific words in a area
shows onset of an event (Sampson et al., 2015). Also, sentiment of posts can show
future status of a product (Mishne et al., 2006). Crime prediction is also possible by
semantic role labeling which is used for both finding the events and entities involved
in them (Wang et al., 2012).
Prediction method based on the extracted features can vary based on the problem.
Regression method have been used for prediction popularity of posts (Szabo and Hu-
berman, 2010) but do not perform well when sentiment data is being used (Zhang and
Skiena, 2009). For predicting election results, Tumasjan et al. (Tumasjan et al., 2010)
use number of tweets mentioning political parties and their sentiments as indicators
of popularity and political views toward them (Tumasjan et al., 2010).
There is no prediction method with perfect accuracy. However, early detection
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of natural disasters reduces hazards in nearby locations. For example, quakes in
areas with geographic proximity are used to predict earthquakes seconds before they
happen (Faulkner et al., 2011).
Warning Systems
“Warning systems detect impending disaster, give that information to people at risk,
and enable those in danger to make decisions and take action” (Sorensen, 2000). There
has been a significant improvement in forecasting and warning systems especially
for hurricane and earthquakes. Meteorologists can now forecast a hurricane 2 to 6
days before it hits an area and Global Seismic Network constantly monitors activity
bellow Earth’s surface. However, lack of complete data on natural hazards, monitoring
instruments, and high dynamic nature of them keep accurate forecasting and warning
a challenge (Reese, 2016) and “a 100% reliable warning system does not exist for any
hazard (Sorensen, 2000)”.
Social media facilitates is also used to deliver official and non-official warnings.
Emergency managers and governmental organization post their warning messages via
social media to be broadly accessed by the public (Houston et al., 2015). Citizens
also report warnings and advice about possible hazards (Imran et al., 2013).
One source of information that can be used to improve accuracy of warnings is data
of built-in accelerometers in cell phones. This data can be used for quick detection
of earthquakes and estimating their intensity and effect. The measurements by these
sensors which are transmitted before the loss of communication are used for estimating
the degree of damage to different areas; the task that can take up to an hour when
performed by helicopters (Faulkner et al., 2014, 2011).
Social media is another source of information for warning systems. USGS uses
tweets to check the accuracy of sensor reports and faster detection of earthquakes.
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Disasters such as Sichuan earthquake in 2008 show that Twitter is faster at reporting
earthquakes than USGS. Earthquakes can be detected using tweets by 60 seconds
earlier than sensors which is a valuable time for warning areas under danger and
start evacuation (Ellis, 2015). In another effort, Sakaki et al. (Sakaki et al., 2010)
consider each Twitter user as a sensor. The tweets by these sensors will be used to
detect the occurrence of disasters and estimate their location.
Event Detection Methods
Events are real-world occurrences that unfold over space and time and. The goal
of event detection methods is extracting events in a stream of news or social media
posts (Allan et al., 1998). Event detection using social media has been extensively
studied and the different categorizations are available for proposed methods in this
area.
When there is no information about future events available, the event detection
method falls into the unspecified category. In this category, detection methods are
based on bursts or trends in the stream of posts (Popescu and Pennacchiotti, 2010).
In the specified event detection methods, contextual information such as time and
venue are available for the anticipated event (Becker et al., 2011a).
Another categorization of events is new versus retrospective. New event detec-
tion is extracting previously unseen events from a stream of posts as they come.
Retrospective event detection also finds unseen events but the data source is an ac-
cumulation of historic posts (Allan et al., 1998). Clustering methods are the most
common in detecting both types of events (Atefeh and Khreich, 2015). But there
are also supervised methods such as Naive Bayes (Becker et al., 2011b) and gradient
boosted decision trees that have been used for new event detection (Popescu et al.,
2011).
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Clustering methods focus on documents and grouping them based on similarities,
i.e. they are document-pivot. There is a group of feature-pivot techniques that use
changes and bursts in features of documents to detect events. These features in-
clude frequency of specific keywords (Power et al., 2014), surprise level of relevant
keywords (Sampson et al., 2015), and statistical features of posts (i.e. word frequen-
cies) (Sakaki et al., 2010).
3.2 Data
The classifier has been trained on a dataset of 13,260 tweets related to Hurricane
Sandy, 2012, with 3,261 requests and 9,999 normal tweets. The requests have been
provided by Purohit et al. (Purohit et al., 2013) and normal tweets are a random
sample of our Hurricane Sandy dataset which was collected during the same period
of time.
3.2.1 Preprocessing
Several preprocessing steps have been followed to prepare the dataset for the
learning step. Duplicate tweets and retweets have been removed because they will
affect frequency of n-grams. Further, we have also eliminated similar tweets; the
tweets which are different in at most one word (not considering the URL). As the
final step, punctuation and stopwords have been removed that results in considering
removing “#” from hashtags and “@” from mentions as simple words.
Before applying our model to the tweets in disaster related jobs, some prepro-
cessing steps will be taken. Punctuations and stop words will be removed form the
tweet’s text and then it will be tokenized. N-grams and LDA topics will be found
based on these tokens. Contextual features will be directly extracted from the meta
data provided by Twitter for each tweet.
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3.2.2 Feature Extraction
After disasters, based on the possible outcomes, specific keywords will be used by
the affected people to report their problems and request for help. These keywords are
important features to distinguish requests from other tweets. We transform keywords
to n-grams in our model by considering unigrams, bigrams, and trigrams. This process
results in thousands of features depending on the number of unique words in the
corpus of tweets. Another content-based feature is the latent topics in tweets which
can be extracted using an LDA model (Blei et al., 2003). By using the LDA topics, we
are reducing the dimensionality of the content-based features from several thousand
n-grams to just twenty features. This process is akin to noise removal and potentially
improves the results.
The second group of features are contextual. Source is the software by which
a tweet has been published such as “web” or “iPhone”. Most popular sources are
the Twitter website, Twitter web clients, and Twitter applications for iPhone and
Android. Location of a tweet is a valuable information. Users can enable the ge-
olocation service while tweeting to help other users and first responders verify that
the author is actually located in the affected area (Morstatter et al., 2014). Users
can mention each other using “@” preceding a username. This feature is used to
establish conversations on Twitter. Hence, the number of mentions in a tweet can
distinguish requests from conversations. In order to convey as much information as
possible in the limited length of a tweet, users requesting help will use less hashtags.
Twitter users include links (URLs) to provide further information by directing other
users to external websites. Requests after a crisis will use URLs to introduce websites
for humanitarian purposes such as collecting monetary donations (Figure 3.6(a)) or
collecting blood donations (Figure 3.6(b)).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.6: Two Request-For-Help Tweets.
3.3 Method
The goal is calculating the probability of a tweet being a request-for-help using a
supervised model, i.e. a classifier. Request are a subset of actionable tweets that are
“relevant to situational awareness; they contain information that provides tactical,
actionable information that can aid people in making decisions, advise others on how
to obtain specific information from various sources, or offer immediate postimpact
help to those affected by the mass emergency”(Vieweg, 2012). The classifier uses
content and context of tweets as input. Content features are directly extracted from
the raw text of tweets and include n-grams (words and phrases) and topics (which
are generated using an LDA model (Blei et al., 2003)). Contextual features are the
metadata of tweets such as entities (e.g., URLs, hashtags, and mentions), times-
tamp, retweet count, and author’s information (e.g., username, location, number of
followees, number of followers, and profile information). Content has been used in
previous studies (Purohit et al., 2013), however, the context has been overlooked.
In the rest of this section, we will provide the details of our process to create our
proposed model. The features that we use in this model are shown in Figure 3.7.
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Figure 3.7: Two Types of Features Used in Detecting Help-Seeking Tweets After
Major Disasters.
3.4 Experiments
To evaluate the performance of our model, we train a supervised classifier on users
who tweeted about Hurricane Sandy, 2012. We chose Decision Tree classifier because
it is interpretable and has the ability to show the importance of each feature in the
final results. The model will label each instance in the dataset as help-seeking or
other. We evaluated the model performance using precision, recall, and F1 score.
As reported in Table 3.1, using all the features results in the best performance, as
expected. However, the change is minor when adding bigrams to the feature set,
suggesting that unigrams contain the most information.
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Table 3.1: Performance of the Proposed Model for Detecting Help-Seeking Tweets.
Feature Set Precision Recall F1 Score
Context 0.710 0.724 0.717
Context and Unigrams 0.896 0.908 0.902
Context, Unigrams, and Bigrams 0.906 0.916 0.911
3.5 Implementation in TweetTracker
Our systems has been implemented as part of TweetTracker which is a powerful
tool for tracking, analyzing, and understanding activities on Twitter (Kumar et al.,
2011). We periodically apply our model to new tweets for crisis related jobs and
update the most probable requests. An example output of our system for a job on
Hurricane Sandy, 2012, is presented in Fig. 3.8. This figure shows a snapshot of
TweetTracker in which there are several tabls to provide information of the selected
job such as Tweets, Users, and Topics. Our system is shown in the rightmost tab,
Requests. This tab is active when the selected job has been marked as crisis related.
In Requests tab, text, author, and probability of the most probable requests are
provided to users. Along with the probability of a tweet being a request, our system
has the ability to show the geotagged most probable requests on the map. This
feature is shown in Fig. 3.9.
3.6 Summary
Social media is widely used in disasters. Millions of tweets are published both
during and in the aftermath of crises. Some of these tweets reflect observations,
while many others contain offers, and requests for help. On the other hand, a major
issue that first responders face is locating victims and distributing resources in this
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Figure 3.8: The Output of Our System, Most Probable Help-Seeking Tweets.
uncertain environment. To help with these challenges, our system has the capability to
distinguish requests and show their information and location. The underlying method
of the proposed systems, along with content, benefit the context which has been used
in previous studies but not regarding the problem of finding social media requests
in aftermath of disasters. In this paper we have both proposed and implemented
a method that can help first responders connect with people who are contributing
and requesting aid, for the purpose of streamlining the process of providing aid to
crisis-afflicted areas.
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Figure 3.9: Output of Our System, Location of Most Probable Geotagged Requests
on the Map of Disaster-Hit Area.
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Chapter 4
DETECTING BOTS ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Bots are prevalent on social media and their malicious actions have been observed
repeatedly (see Section 2.1 for more details). Thus, researchers have put great effort
into understanding bots and developing methods to detect them. In supervised bot
detection methods, which are the focus of this work, a labeled dataset of bots and
human users is available prior to training a machine learning classifier. Using these
labels, we can learn characteristics that discriminate bots from humans and use them
to build classifiers that predict class labels (bot or human). The classifiers are then
tested on unobserved datasets and evaluated using metrics such as precision, recall,
and F1 score.
A common theme among previous bot detection methods is attempting to max-
imize precision (Lee et al., 2011; Chu et al., 2012; Varol et al., 2017). This is one
extreme: the sole purpose is to minimize false positives and avoid mistakenly mark-
ing a human user as bot. By doing this, detection methods avoid removing human
users from the site but leave many bots undetected. The other extreme is eliminating
bots from social media at the price of removing human users. This approach is not
preferable either. A method for finding a trade-off between precision and recall is
optimizing for F1 score which is the harmonic mean between precision and recall.
Harmonic mean is dominated by the minimum of its arguments. Hence, F1 cannot
become arbitrarily large when either precision or recall is unchanged and the other
metric is increased. This prevents bot detection algorithms from landing on trivial
solutions (marking all users as bots or humans) to gain high F1. However, considering
the same weight for precision and recall in F1 prevents us from having control over the
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final values of either precision or recall. In other words, two classifiers are considered
equally good if they have the same F1 regardless of the fact that one might result in
higher recall and the other one a higher precision. The ideal case is finding a solution
close to optimum F1 that allows us to focus on precision or recall depending on the
application.
Figure 4.1: Our Goal Is Having a Recall-Focused Approach Close to the Optimal
F1.
To align with corporate goals (having a large number of active users and retain-
ing human users by avoiding accidentally suspending their accounts), bot detection
models with high precision are preferable. However, from a user’s perspective, both
social media users and researchers alike, the preferable situation is encountering a
minimum number of bots. So, in this case, high recall is preferred. In this work, we
focus on developing supervised algorithms aligned with a user’s perspective: Boos-
tOR and REFOCUS. We use multiple real-world datasets to show how we can find a
sweet spot between blindly optimizing for F1 or recall as shown in Fig. 4.1. We also
compare our proposed methods with state-of-the-art bot detection models to show
that focusing on recall does not necessarily result in overall performance deterioration
in terms of F1.
4.1 Data
In order to build a classifier, we need to obtain a gold standard dataset: a set of
users and their bot/human label to evaluate the results. Of course, this information
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does not come affixed to each user when the researcher collects the dataset. Thus,
the onus is on the researcher to collect these labels. There are three main approaches
to this:
• Manual annotation: As in most other classification problems, manual labeling
can be to obtain ground truth. Although this method has been used widely
in this field (Xie et al., 2008; Chu et al., 2010; Grier et al., 2010; Ratkiewicz
et al., 2011a; Cook et al., 2014), we still have the challenge of how to choose
annotators and how many annotators are sufficient in order to achieve reliable
labels. Furthermore, this method does not scale as it takes time to recruit users
and funds to pay them.
• Suspended users lists: This method leverages the social networking site itself to
obtain the labels. The researcher simply observes the users and sees which ones
get suspended or removed by the site. This approach is simple, but the concern
remains that the reason of suspension and deletion is not usually indicated in
such lists. Thus, many suspension lists include users who violated other rules
and regulations of the site. Methods proposed in (John et al., 2009; Thomas
et al., 2012; Lee and Kim, 2014) use these lists.
• Honeypots: A newer ground truth acquisition method is based on using hon-
eypots, bots created by the researcher to lure other bots. Honeypots show
non-human behaviors and can be made in groups to increase their effect by
connecting and interacting with each other without intervention in activities of
normal users. Due to the fact that they are designed in a way that any normal
user can immediately tell they are bots, any user in the network that connects
to a honeypot will be considered as a bot. By using this method, a researcher
can gather a large set of bots active in a network with high confidence. This
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method has been applied before (Lee et al., 2011; Thonnard and Dacier, 2011;
Morstatter et al., 2016). We provide a detailed description of characteristics of
honeypots for different scenarios and applications in Appendix B.
4.1.1 Description of Datasets
To show the robustness of our models with respect to the language, topic, time,
and labeling mechanism, we use the datasets represented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Statistics of the Datasets Used in This Study.
Property Arabic Honeypot Social Spambot 1 Social Spambot 2
Tweets 637,435 4,449,395 4,257,918
Retweets 209,703 782,267 754,104
Human Accounts 2,317 1,083 1,083
Bot Accounts 1,978 991 464
Bot Ratio 46.05% 47.78% 29.99%
Labeling Approach Honeypot Manual Manual
• Libya Dataset: from February 3rd, 2011 to February 21st, 2013, we collected
Twitter data pertaining to Arab Spring activity in Libya. The data was col-
lected from Twitter’s Streaming API1, a service which provides a stream of
tweets matching a query (Kumar et al., 2014b). The query we used to collect
this data consisted of the following keywords: #libya, #gaddafi, #benghazi,
#brega, #misrata, #nalut, #nafusa, #rhaibat, as well as a geographic bound-
ing box around Libya2. Statistics on the dataset are shown in Table 4.1.
We obtained labels of whether a user is a bot or human by observing how
Twitter handled these users. In February of 2015, we crawled each user in the
1https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/reference/post/statuses/filter
2Southwest Lng/Lat: 23.4/10.0; Northeast Lng/Lat: 33.0,25.0.
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dataset and observed the status of his Twitter account. We observed the user’s
account status via the statuses/user_timeline API endpoint3. The status
can take on one of three values:
1. Active: A user whose account is still open and available on the site.
2. Deleted: A user whose account has been deleted. A user can be deleted
by violating Twitter’s policies. This is considered a permanent ban.
3. Suspended: A user whose account has been suspended for violating Twit-
ter’s policies. This is considered a temporary ban, where the user can
petition Twitter to have his account reinstated.
These labels were obtained by using Twitter’s APIs to crawl the dataset and
inspecting the response code from the API. Through this process we discovered
that 92.5% of the users are active, 4.7% are deleted, and 2.8% are suspended.
Because deleted and suspended have similar meanings, we consider both labels
as a bot.
At first glance, we notice that the fraction of users identified as bots by this
labeling technique is around 7.5%. This distribution gives a very conservative
estimate of the number of bots on Twitter. This is a side effect of an indus-
try approach which focuses purely on precision in order to avoid accidentally
deleting some real users. We realize that this is not representative of the true
distribution of bots on the site (Wei et al., 2015), and that many bots may have
been overlooked by Twitter. With this in mind, we introduce our next dataset
which focuses on detecting bots in the wild through honeypots which tweet
specific content. In response to this, we collect another dataset by focusing on
3https://dev.twitter.com/rest/reference/get/statuses/user_timeline
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detecting bots in the wild using honeypots which tweet specific content, Arabic
Honeypot Dataset.
• Arabic Honeypot Dataset (Morstatter et al., 2016): this dataset consists of
bots tweeting messages in Arabic. To collect this dataset, we construct a hon-
eypot network. This network consists of 9 accounts controlled automatically
by a single controller. Each account tweets messages containing Arabic phrases
identified by a subject matter expert pertaining to a specific group of people.
Each account also randomly follows other honeypots in our network. Since bots
have a lower chance of forming social ties (Thomas et al., 2011), we perform this
random following process to lower the chance that our accounts are deleted by
Twitter’s automatic account removal algorithm. Additionally, each honeypot
can randomly retweet one of the other honeypots it follows in order to give that
honeypot prominence on the network and lower its probability of being deleted
due to Twitter’s policies.
While the honeypot method yields a set of bot accounts, it does not give us
a set of real users. This is because we only look at the bot followers to our
honeypots, and we do not have ground truth labels for real users. In order
to test our model, we need to collect a set of real users to use as negative
training instances. To do this, we manually inspected a seed set of 10 users
who also tweeted the same phrases4. We did this to ensure that the algorithm
we train finds bot patterns in the text, and does not simply learn the difference
in language distributions. Moving forward with the assumption that real users
do not follow malicious bots, we use 1-link snowball sampling to collect their
4We did not extract verified accounts as these users are not normal users. They are often con-
trolled by public relations firms and tweet on specific topics.
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immediate network. We ensured that each user in the sample had fewer than
1,000 followers to make sure that we did not collect any celebrities (Zafarani
et al., 2014). We also inspected each user in the sample to ensure that he
tweeted one of the phrases at some point in his last 200 tweets. This approach
yielded 3,107 real-world accounts, which helped us to maintain the same class
distribution reported in other approaches (Lee et al., 2011). More details on
the honeypot approach and the mechanism we used is provided in Appendix B.
• Social Spambot Datasets (Cresci et al., 2017): Cresci et al. in their previous
work on detecting social bots on Twitter namely: test set #1 and test set
#2. We call these datasets Social Spambots 1 and 2, respectively, in our work.
Each dataset is a combination of social spambots and human users on Twitter.
Since the Arabic Honeypot Dataset was focused on detecting bots that may
evade existing Twitter spam filters, this dataset was also chosen due to its self-
proclaimed detection of evolving Twitter social bots. The subsets we chose
from Cresci et al. are their two testing datasets which are a combination of the
datasets labeled “Social Spambots #1”,“Social Spambots #3”, and “Genuine
Accounts” in their work (Cresci et al., 2017). Specifically, in their work, “test
set #1” was comprised of the entire set of “Social Spambots #1” plus an equal
number of “Genuine Accounts” (Cresci et al., 2017). Similarly, “test set #2”
was made up of the entire set of “Social Spambots #3” and an equal number
of “Genuine Accounts” from that paper (Cresci et al., 2017).
To collect the human user accounts, Cresci et al. contacted random users, asked
a natural language question, and manually evaluated if the user was a human.
Social Spambots 1 contains these genuine accounts plus social bots that were
discovered during the 2014 Mayoral election in Rome, Italy which were used
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to retweet a candidate within minutes of his original posting. Social Spambots
2 includes the genuine accounts and social bots that advertised products on
Amazon.com by deceitfully spamming URLs which point to the products. We
obtained these datasets directly from the BotOrNot Bot Repository (Davis
et al., 2016).
4.1.2 Feature Extraction
Bot accounts are created by malicious actors to serve specific purposes. Thus,
their content can be a strong indicator to expose such potentially automated accounts.
The problem with using content for bot detection is that the raw text features are of
high dimensionality and sparse. Inspired by the recent advances of topic modeling,
we adopt Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003) to obtain a topic
representation of each user. LDA is an unsupervised and probabilistic model that
has been proven useful for extracting latent semantics of documents. The principle
idea behind LDA is that it treats each document as a distribution over topics, and
each topic as a distribution over the vocabulary in the dataset. LDA requires one
parameter5, K, the number of topics in the corpus. From here, LDA learns two
matrices:
1. Φ: the Topic ×Word matrix. Each topic in LDA, Φi, is a probability distri-
bution over the entire vocabulary in the corpus. Thus, Φji is the probability of
word j occurring in topic i.
2. Θ: the Document× Topic matrix. Since each document is modeled as a distri-
bution over topics, this each row, Θi, contains the document’s distribution over
all of the topics learned by LDA.
5We use the default hyperparameter value of α = 1K , and β = 1K .
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In this approach, we treat the user as a document. Each user’s document consists
of the concatenation of all of the content of his tweets. We feed these documents
into LDA with K topics, obtaining Φ and Θ values for the corpus6. Since the Θ
matrix contains the affinity for each user to each topic, we can treat these as features
to be fed into a classifier. We build an SVM classifier by directly using Θ as the
Instance× Feature matrix, where the instances are users and the features are their
affinities for the latent dimensions discovered by LDA. We follow the assumption
that, since bots are naturally more interested in certain topics, denoting each user
as a distribution over different topics may help to better identify them from regular
accounts (Morstatter et al., 2016).
4.2 Method
In this section, we formally define what precision (P ), recall (R), and Fβ score.
Then introduce two recall-focused methods that we proposed, BoostOR and REFO-
CUS.
4.2.1 Evaluation Metrics
classifiers can be evaluated using precision (P ) and recall (R) defined in equation
4.1. True Postive (tp), True Negative (tn), False Positive (fp), and False Negative
(fn) are shown in Fig. 4.2.
P =
tp
tp+ fp
, R =
tp
tp+ fn
(4.1)
It is common to see a fall in precision when the classifier has high recall and vise
versa. To avoid this pitfall, one might use Fβ score which is the weighted harmonic
6We will discuss our selection of K in the experiments section.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of True Negative - (b): tn, False Positive - (c): fp, True
Positive - (d): tp, and False Negative - (e): fn for a Classifier Trained on Dataset (a)
When the Classifier Labels a Subset of Users as Bots (Positive Class) - bcl - and the
Rest as Humans (Negative Class) - hcl.
mean of precision and recall and is defined in equation 4.2.
Fβ =
(1 + β2)PR
βP +R
(4.2)
Mostly commonly used Fβ score to evaluate the overall performance of a classifier
because it is maximized when we have a trade-off between precision and recall. How-
ever, having two classifiers with the same F1, one might have a higher recall and the
other have a higher precision. Because of our focus on recall, we will use Fβ scores
with β > 1. With β values greater than one, we put more emphasis on recall and
penalizing the classifier more when it is losing on recall. We explain the details of
using this metric in designing a recall-focused approach in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.2 Method I: BoostOR
Since bots are usually generated by different parties for different purposes, the
discriminant characteristics of bots from different groups are unrelated. Such het-
erogeneity of bots makes it challenging to come up with a classifier. To this end,
we formulate the problem as a boosting task. Boosting methods aim to achieve an
optimal classifier through ensembling weak classifiers, which are more proper for this
problem since different weak classifiers will focus on different bots.
First, we investigate whether boosting algorithms are directly applicable for bot
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detection. For generality, we selected AdaBoost (Freund and Schapire, 1997) for
optimization. AdaBoost trains one weak classifier based on all training examples
every iteration. In each iteration, the misclassified examples in the previous round
are higher weighted in the next round. The final classifier is the weighted ensemble
of all weak classifiers. Therefore, the key issues are how the weight are determined
for different weak classifiers and training examples. Here we use α to denote classifier
weight, the weight of classifier t can be calculated as follows:
αt = −1
2
ln(βt), (4.3)
where βt denotes the extent of the base learner deviates from the optimal solution.
βt can be directly calculated with training error ϵ as follows:
βt =
ϵt
1− ϵt . (4.4)
As shown in Eq. 4.5, αt is greater than zero if ϵt is less than 50%; while αt is less
than zero if ϵt is greater than 50%. ϵt can be calculated through Eq. 4.5.
ϵt =
1∑m
i=1Dt(i)
m∑
i=1
Dt(i)1(hi(vi) ̸= yi), (4.5)
where the function 1(·) equals one when the condition holds, and zero otherwise.
The second issue is to determine the weight of each training instance at each
iteration. The instance weight is regulated depending on whether it is correctly
classified in the previous round and the performance of the weak learner. As denoted
in Eq. 4.6, when the weak learner’s error rate is less than 50%, weights of misclassified
users will increase while those of the rest decrease.
Dt+1(i) =
Dt(i)exp(−αtyiht(vi))
Zt
(4.6)
Zt =
m∑
i=1
Dt(i)exp(−αtyiht(vi)).
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The algorithm of AdaBoost for bot detection is illustrated in Algorithm 1. Note
that m is the number of all users and k is the number of features. Since LDA is
adopted to represent the user, here each user vector vi can be viewed as a probability
distribution over k topics. The user labels are denoted by Y = {y1, . . . , ym} ∈
{−1, 1}m×1, where yi = 1 means that user i is a bot.
Input: The user-feature matrix V ∈ Rm×k,
the user-label matrix Y ∈ {−1, 1}m×1 and a weak learner h : V→ Y
the initial user weight vector D1 = (D1(1), . . . ,D1(m))
the maximum number of iterations maxiter.
Output: The ensemble classifier H(v) = sign(∑Tt=1 αtht(v))
For t = 1, …, maxiter
Train weak learner using instance weight Dt ;
Get the trained classifier ht : V→ Y and training error ϵt as Eq. 4.5;
Calculate the weight αt ∈ R for ht as Eq. 4.3;
Update user weight as Eq. 4.6;
until Convergence.
Algorithm 1: AdaBoost for Bot Detection
Since we aim to achieve a classifier which is sensitive to bots, we investigate how
AdaBoost could be adapted for optimizing recall. As mentioned before, the weight
of bots may be reduced if they are correctly classified. The reduction of weight leads
subsequent weak classifiers to less focus on these bots, which is unfavourable. There-
fore, we next investigate how the sensitivity to bots can be kept through regulating
the weights of training instances. An intuitive solution is to avoid reducing weights
of bots, which can be formulated as follows:
Dt+1(i) = Dt(i)β
−yi|hi(vi−yi)|. (4.7)
54
As shown in Eq. 4.7, if a regular user is predicted to be a bot, the corresponding
weight will be multiplied by β|hi(vi−yi)| ∈ (0, 1], while the mislabeled bots still gain
more weights. The loss between prediction and ground truth spans between the
range of [0, 1], and an exponential form ensemble predictor is adopted, which both
enable Theorem 1 to hold. This means that the training error after T iterations
is bounded. We name the new boosting algorithm as Boosting through Optimizing
Recall (BoostOR). The detailed algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Figure 4.3
illustrates how the example weight is updated in AdaBoost model. The mislabeled
instances will gain a larger weight in the second round of iteration. While in BoostOR,
the weight change depends on the labels of the user. If a bot is wrongly predicted,
its weight is enlarged. mislabeled regular users are more often ignored.
AdaBoost
Bot
Regular 
Account
Decision
Boundary
Figure 4.3: Illustration of Updating Instance Weights in AdaBoost.
However, two questions need to be answered about BoostOR: 1) will it converge
by keeping weights of bots? 2) will trivial solutions be achieved by classifying all
examples as bots? To answer the first question, we introduce Theorem 1 to indicate
the convergence rate of the algorithm:
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Theorem 1 After T iterations, the average training loss of each iteration of BoostOR
is upper bounded by:
min
i
Li
T
+
√
2Lˆ ln(m)
T
+
ln(m)
T
where Li =
1
2
T∑
j=1
|hj(vi − yi)|
(4.8)
The corresponding proof can be found in (Freund and Schapire, 1997), where the
range of convergence rate is also provided. The rate of convergence is no more than
O(
√
ln(m)/T ) and can be as fast as O(ln(m)/T ). Lˆ is the loss of optimal solution.
Since the weight of regular users are reduced instead of removed, trivial solutions
will not be easily achieved in real world data, where bots are the minority group. We
empirically prove this with real world Twitter datasets in Section 4.3.
Input: The user-feature matrix V ∈ Rm×k,
the user-label matrix Y ∈ {1,−1}m×1 and a weak learner h : v→ y
the initial user weight vector D1 = (D1(1), . . . ,D1(m))
the maximum number of iterations maxiter.
Output: The ensemble classifier H(v) = sign(Πmaxiteri=1 (β−hi(v)i − β−
1
2
i )
For t = 1, …, maxiter
Train weak learner using instance weight Dt ;
Get the trained classifier ht : V→ Y and training error ϵt as Eq. 4.5;
Calculate the weight αt ∈ R for ht as Eq. 4.3;
Update user weight as Eq. 4.7;
until Convergence.
Algorithm 2: BoostOR for Bot Detection
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4.2.3 Method II: REFOCUS
A bot detection classifier generates the probability of being a bot (belonging to
the positive class) for each instance in the dataset. To assign a binary label to users,
a classifier uses a threshold (commonly set to 0.5 (Pedregosa et al., 2011)) to decide;
if the probability of being a bot is more than the classification threshold then the
user is labeled as a bot, otherwise as a human.
Precision and recall can be independently maximized easily. A trivial approach
for increasing the recall is lowering the classification threshold and classifying more
users as bots. Alternatively, increasing the classification threshold results in labeling
most users as humans, with only the unquestionably obvious bot users labeled as
bots, and causes a trivial increase in precision. However, precision and recall are not
independent from each other: increasing one might result in decreasing the other.
One approach for finding a trade-off between precision and recall is using the Fβ
score.
With β values greater than one, β times more weight is put on recall and for
values less than one, β times more weight is associated with precision.
4.2.4 Searching for a Trade-off: Selecting β
Our goal is optimizing for recall, hence, we utilize Fβ with β > 1 to find the
best classification threshold: a sweet spot between where F1 (overall performance)
is maximized and where R = 1. The framework of our recall focused approach is
presented in Fig. 4.4. We divide the dataset to 90% Train and 10% Test. Then,
for ten iterations, we divide Train to 90% Traini and 10% V ali which are training
and validation sets respectively; Traini is 81% of the whole data and V ali is 9%. In
each iteration, we train a classifier Ci on Traini, change the classification threshold
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between 0.1 and 0.9 with 0.1 steps, and find the threshold that results in the highest
Fβ score on V ali; we call this threshold ti. After the tenth iteration, we get an average
of the thresholds t1 to t10 to find the average threshold t. Then we train a classifier,
C, on Train and using t, we find the precision, recall, and F1 score. We repeat this
process ten times and report the average of precision, recall, and F1 scores as our
final results.
Figure 4.4: Framework for the Proposed Bot Detection Model, REFOCUS.
We need to test different values of β in the training phase to find the best clas-
sification threshold using Fβ. As we increase β, precision has a non-increasing trend
and recall has a non-decreasing trend. This happens because as we increase β we put
more weight on recall in comparison to precision. More formally
Rβi ≥ Rβj and Pβi ≤ Pβj if βi > βj (4.9)
Due to this non-increasing pattern of precision with increase of β, we prefer to main-
tain a low β as long as we do not sacrifice the chance of achieving a higher recall with
minor loss in precision. To find the right β, βopt, we start from β = 1 and at step t
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we set βopt = βt if
(Rβt −Rβt−1) > (F βt−11 − F βt1 ) (4.10)
Meaning that we choose a larger β if the gain in R is more than the loss in F1.
4.3 Experiments
In this section we empirically investigate the performance of our proposed ap-
proaches. For each of the proposed methods, BoostOR and REFOCUS, we’ll present
their performance in different scenarios and in comparison with baseline bot detection
models.
4.3.1 Evaluating BoostOR
In this section we empirically investigate the performance of BoostOR with respect
the ability to maximize the F1 score on bot detection. We perform two experiments:
first to show the performance of different algorithms, and second to show how the
parameters used in building the AdaBoost and BoostOR models can influence the
results of these methods.
Model Parameters
In this section, we study how the number of topics will influence the performance
of the proposed model, BoostOR. The change of precision, recall and F1 score as a
function of K is illustrated in Figure 4.5. On both datasets, the dimensionality spans
from 50 to 500 and the variations of performance are observed.
As shown in the Figure 4.5, the best performance is achieved when there are
around 200 topics. When K deviates from the optimal value of 200, no matter in-
creasing or decreasing, the performance decreases. Too many topics enable some
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redundant and meaningless topics to exist, while some important topics may be ne-
glected if the K is too small.
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Figure 4.5: Precision, Recall, and F1 Score of BoostOR with Varying Number of
Topics.
Testing the Overall Performance
We introduce a set of heuristics that are used to differentiate bot from non-bot users in
social media. These heuristics are based upon state-of-the-art studies in bot detection
on social media and will be used as baselines in evaluating the performance of the
proposed model.
• Fraction of Retweets: this measures the number of times the user published a
retweet divided by the number of tweets the user has published, calculated as:
HeuristicRetweet(u) =
|{x|x ∈ tweetsu, x is retweet}|
|tweetsu| . (4.11)
Whether a tweet is a retweet is determined by looking at the “retweeted_status”
field of the tweet’s data when returned through the API. If the field contains
tweet information, we consider it to be a retweet. This measure was introduced
in (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011b), and hypothesizes that bots are unable to produce
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original content, so they rely on the retweet feature in Twitter in order to
establish their presence.
• Average Tweet Length: a tweet’s text is limited to 140 characters, but it is
possible that bots post fewer than that as they could just be promoting a URL
or a hashtag (Lee and Kim, 2014). To account for this, we introduce this
heuristic which measures the average length of the user’s tweets. It is the sum
of the characters in all of the tweets the user has published divided by the
number of tweets the user has published, formally:
HeuristicLength(u) =
∑|tweetsu|
i |tweetsui |
|tweetsu| , (4.12)
where |tweetsui | is the length of user u’s i-th tweet, measured by the number of
characters in the tweet.
• Fraction of URLs: this measures the number of times the user published a tweet
containing a URL divided by the number of tweets the user has published,
formally:
HeuristicURL(u) =
|{x|x ∈ tweetsu, x contains URL}|
|tweetsu| . (4.13)
Whether a tweet contains a URL is determined by looking at the “entities”
field of the tweet returned by Twitter’s API. This measure has been studied
previously (Ratkiewicz et al., 2011a; Xie et al., 2008), and hypothesizes that
bots are motivated to persuade real users into visiting external sites operated
by their controller. In this way, this heuristic traps bots that are trying to
promote URLs in their tweets.
• Average Time Between Tweets: it has been discovered that many bots tweet
in a “bursty” nature (Lee and Kim, 2014; Xie et al., 2008), publishing many of
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their tweets within a short amount of time. This behavior is measured as:
HeuristicTime(u) =
1
|tweetsu| − 1
N∑
i=2
(ti − ti−1), (4.14)
where ti is the time stamp of the i-th tweet in u’s timeline, sorted chronologically
in ascending order (i.e. ti ≥ ti−1).
We apply each heuristic, as well as AdaBoost and BoostOR to both the Libya
dataset, shown in Table 4.3, and the Arabic Honeypot dataset, shown in Table 4.4.
We find that both AdaBoost and BoostOR outperform the heuristics, with BoostOR
performing the best on both datasets. Interestingly, we find that SVM underperforms,
achieving a worse result than the heuristics when optimizing the F1 score.
One thing to note about the heuristics is that they conform to the class distribu-
tion. That is, when they achieve their maximum performance they are simply always
predicting the user is a bot. In other words, the results of heuristic measures indicate
that we should delete our entire dataset for both datasets. While this yields what
seem to be competitive results, the implication of this approach is not reasonable.
While the F1 score is useful to measure the performance, we need to dig deeper to
understand the implication of these results.
To illustrate the difference in performance between the heuristics and our proposed
model, we show a confusion matrix of the best-performing heuristic, HeuristicTime,
and a confusion matrix of BoostOR in Table 4.2 on the Arabic Honeypot dataset.
First, we notice that the heuristic never misclassifies as a human as a bot. This is in
line with the goals of the industry. However, we see in the BoostOR results that we
achieve superior performance by lowering the false-negative rate of the model, which
is in line with the goals of the researcher.
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Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix for the HeuristicTime and BoostOR on the Arabic
Honeypot Dataset.
Prediction
HeuristicTime BoostOR
Bot Human Bot Human
Tr
ut
h Bot 49.9% 50% 42.8% 7.7%
Human 0% 0.1% 14.8% 34.7%
4.3.2 Evaluating REFOCUS
first, we investigate the effect of β. We evaluate the classification results using
values of β ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and show that F2 performs the best. Second, we explain
the choice of classification algorithm and model parameters. Then, we compare our
approach with a state-of-the-art bot detection model, BotOrNot (Davis et al., 2016).
Table 4.3: Comparison Between BoostOR and Heuristics on the Libya Dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1
HeuristicURL 6.74% 65.12% 12.21%
HeuristicRetweet% 7.73% 53.63% 13.51%
HeuristicLength 7.74% 53.63% 13.51%
HeuristicTime 7.48% 99.89% 13.91%
SVM 29.24% 8.78% 13.53%
AdaBoost 75.25% 7.48% 13.61%
BoostOR 75.41% 8.14% 14.69%
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Table 4.4: Comparison Between BoostOR and Heuristics on the Arabic Honeypot
Dataset.
Method Precision Recall F1
HeuristicURL 49.69% 96.39% 65.58%
HeuristicRetweet% 50.05% 99.33% 66.56%
HeuristicLength 50.00% 99.82% 66.63%
HeuristicTime 49.99% 99.96% 66.65%
SVM 62.41% 62.52% 62.47%
AdaBoost 79.76% 72.41% 75.91%
BoostOR 71.42% 82.48% 76.55%
Searching for the Right β
It is intuitive that using a Fβ when β > 1 for training a classifier helps us find the
classification threshold that results in higher recall as compared to when β = 1.
However, it raises two questions: (1) what is best value of β and can we increase
it indefinitely to reach the highest recall possible? (2) Does the model trained using
β > 1 still perform well in terms of F1 or we will drastically lose precision? We answer
the first question here and the second one in Section 4.3.2.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.6: Effect of β on Precision (P ), Recall (R), and Overall Performance (F1).
In Each Dataset, We Change β from 1 to 5, Use Fβ for Finding the Best Classification
Threshold in the Training Phase and Report P , R, and F1 on the Test Set.
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We test our model using the framework in Fig. 4.4 on three datsets: Arabic
Honeypot, Social Spambot 1, and Social Spambot 2. The resutls are shown in Fig.
4.6. In Social Spambots 1, we do not observe any change in the overall performance
in terms of F1 as we change the β. Hence, any of the Fβ scores can be used to find
the best classification threshold. In Arabic Honeypot and Social Spambot 2, we see
some variations in precision, recall, and overall performance. β = 2 gives us the best
trade-off between precision and recall because if we go from F1 to F2 on the x axis,
we gain on recall but lose on the overall performance due to the decrease in precision.
But, our focus is on recall and we are willing to lose on overall performance if we can
gain significantly on recall. Hence, we prefer F2 over F1 because the loss in the overall
performance is smaller that the gain in recall; in other words, the slope of recall line
is larger than the slope of F1 line. Further increase in β does not provide enough gain
on recall in comparison to the loss in the overall performance; we do not see sharp
slopes anymore.
Model Parameters
For comparing the overall performance of REFOCUS with other bot detection meth-
ods, we need to decide on the number of topics in LDA and the classification model.
Due to the similarity between our feature extraction and the one by Morstatter et
al. (Morstatter et al., 2016) we follow their observation that 200 topics generated the
highest F1 in the Arabic Honeypot dataset and set number of topics to 200.
We test multiple classification algorithms that are observed to have high perfor-
mance in the problem of bot detection (Alothali et al., 2018) to find the best fit for
REFOCUS: Decision Tree, Random Forest, and SVM. We use Python Scikit-learn
package (Pedregosa et al., 2011) for implementation with default settings except
max_depth = 1. As shown in Table 4.5. All classifiers achieve very similar (differ-
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ence less than 0.5%) F1 score except for Random Forest that has lower performance.
We choose SVM for the rest of our experiments because it has similar or higher R and
similar F1 . Worth mentioning that our method can be built on top of any classifier
to help improve recall without sacrificing the overall performance.
Table 4.5: Performance of REFOCUS When Implemented Using Different Classi-
fiers.
Arabic Honeypot Social Spambot 1 Social Spambot 2
Classifier P R F1 P R F1 P R F1
Decision Tree 0.726 0.771 0.745 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.995 0.995
Random Forest 0.787 0.769 0.777 0.995 0.985 0.990 0.995 0.993 0.994
SVM 0.657 0.916 0.765 1.0 0.991 0.995 0.998 0.992 0.995
Table 4.6: Comparison Between REFOCUS and Baseline Bot Detection Methods.
Dataset Method P R F1 ROC
Arabic
Honeypot
SVM 0.655 0.919 0.765 0.849
REFOCUS 0.601 0.983 0.746 0.849
BotOrNot 0.472 0.523 0.496 0.514
Social
Spambot 1
SVM 1.0 0.991 0.995 0.997
REFOCUS 1.0 0.993 0.996 0.997
BotOrNot 0.963 0.961 0.962 0.969
Social
Spambot 2
SVM 0.986 0.915 0.949 0.996
REFOCUS 0.924 0.971 0.945 0.996
BotOrNot 0.954 0.939 0.946 0.957
Testing the Overall Performance
We compare our proposed approach, REFOCUS, with two baselines:
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• SVM : REFOCUS uses SVM to train multiple classifiers on subsamples of the
dataset and learns the best recall-precision trade-off using Fβ. Hence, we com-
pare our method with SVM when its parameters are set to default and it gen-
erates the class labels (1 or -1) using 0.5 as threshold. Users are represented
with 200 LDA topics and we use 10-fold cross validation.
• BotOrNot (Davis et al., 2016; Varol et al., 2017): this supervised bot detection
model exploits 1150 features in six categories: user-based, friends, network,
temporal, content and language, and sentiment. The model uses a Random
Forest classifier and is trained on multiple publicly available datasets. BotOrNot
has been used for generating ground-truth due to its performance.
We perform two sets of experiments. In the first one, we use the Arabic Honeypot
dataset. We use an LDA model with 200 topics to extract features from the dataset
then we apply REFOCUS and report the results. However, using this dataset raises
the concern that our approach might not perform as well on non-Arabic tweets. Hence
we also perform the second experiment. We follow the same procedure but use the
datasets that were collected by Cresci et al. (Cresci et al., 2017). These datasets (as
explained in Section 4.1.1) have three advantages: they are among the most recent
publicly available labeled datasets for bots, they include new and more complicated
bots, and a majority of the tweets are in English. Hence, by testing our approach on
Cresci’s datasets, we show that our model performs well regardless of the language
of tweets and is resilient to new types of bots that emerge on social media.
The results are presented in Table 4.6. For the experiments on Cresci’s datasets,
we do not balance the classes due to small size of the data. Hence, we also include
the ROC AUC in our results. The ROC AUC for a classifier that randomly assigns
labels to instances is 0.5 regardless of the class balance and is a helpful metric to
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assess classifiers when the samples of one class are more than the other. Reserving
the class imbalance is also helpful to mimic the real world scenario where bots are a
small portion of all users on social media (Varol et al., 2017).
In the first experiment, on the Arabic Honeypot dataset, SVM has higher precision
and lower recall in comparison to REFOCUS. The reason is that SVM only labels
a user as bot if the predicted probability of being a bot for that user is over 0.5.
However, our method learns the best threshold for optimizing recall while reaching a
high F1. Hence REFOCUS chooses a lower threshold (0.35 in this case). This choice
results in 2% lower F1, however, we are willing to tolerate this loss due to 6% gain in
recall. BotOrNot performs considerably worse in this dataset in comparison to the
Social Spambot datasets. The reason is that Social Spambot datasets have been used
in training BotOrNot and it is expected for classifiers to have lower performance on
unseen datasets (e.g. Arabic Honeypot).
In the second experiment, we test our method on two non-Arabic datasets which
are obtained using a manual annotation method to show that our results are robust to
variations in datasets such as language. In Social Spambots 1, SVM and our proposed
approach perform almost identically with an slightly better recall in REFOCUS. The
reason is that the differences between instances in human and bot classes are well
captured by the classifiers to the extent that the classifier (either SVM or REFOCUS)
are very confident in the labeling. Hence, each instance gets a high probability of
being in its actual class and changing the threshold does not change the classification
results much. We also observe that our approach outperforms BotOrNot. On Social
Spambots 2, SVM and BotOrNot outperform our approach in precision and have
lower recall, similar to the Arabic Honeypot dataset, because they are not is not
designed to optimize on recall. F1 of our approach is similar to the baselines.
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4.4 Summary
The dominant trend among the previously proposed methods for bot detection
is solely focusing on precision, making sure that no human user is marked as a bot,
or optimizing for F1. In this work, we showed that we can focus on recall of a bot
detection model without sacrificing the overall performance. We tested our method
on three real-word datasets and observed that using F2 score in the training phase
results in finding the best classification threshold for optimizing recall and having high
overall performance in terms of F1. In the future, we wish to explore the robustness of
our method on translated datasets and also measure its effectiveness in discriminating
different types of bots in a dataset.
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Chapter 5
DETECTING FAKE CONTENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA
Due to the increasing amount of our time spent on social media platforms, it is no sur-
prise that people tend to receive their news content through social media sites more
than before. For example, a quarter of US adults used social media as their main
source of election news and campaign updates during the US presidential election in
2016 (Shearer, 2016). This high rate of engagement with online news can mainly be
attributed to the nature of the social media platforms themselves, which are typi-
cally inexpensive, provide easy access, and support fast dissemination not possible
through traditional media outlets. However, despite these advantages, the quality of
news on social media is considered lower than that of traditional news outlets. A
factor contributing to this low quality is wide-spread of fake news articles online; fake
news articles are low-quality news stories with intentionally false information (Shu
et al., 2017). During the US presidential election in 2016, fake stories supporting
one candidate were shared 30 million times on Facebook and over one million tweets
related to the fake news story “Pizzagate” 1 were shared on Twitter.
Fake news has several significant negative societal effects. First, people may ac-
cept deliberate lies as truths. The likelihood of accepting fake news as true increase
after observing it repeatedly (Hasher et al., 1977) especially when it aligns with the
user’s beliefs (Weir, 2017). Second, fake news may change the way people respond to
legitimate news. When people are inundated with fake news, the line between fake
news and true news become more uncertain, fake news spreaders make users doubt
the nature of real news at the least and leave them in the mindset that everything is
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pizzagate\_conspiracy\_theory
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biased and conflicted and it is impossible to distinguish fake from real news (Lynch,
2016). Finally, the prevalence of fake news has the potential to break the trustwor-
thiness of the entire news ecosystem. For example, in the last three months leading
to the US presidential election in 2016, fake news stories posted on Facebook gained
more engagement by users in comparison to true news (Silverman, 2016). Thus, it’s
critical to detect fake news on social media to mitigate these negative effects, hopefully
benefiting the general public and the entire news ecosystem.
There are three aspects to the problem of detecting fake news: malicious users who
generate fake news, the fake news articles/posts and their content, and the users who
are exposed to fake news articles. Majority of fake news detection approaches focus on
the first two aspects and oversee the users who are exposed to fake news articles. For
example, researchers have used the content of posts and context surrounding them
to detect fake news and malicious actors. Approaches that incorporate content use
linguistic and visual features and context-based approaches exploit features extracted
from users, posts, and network. Recent research advancements aggregate users’ pro-
files and engagements on news pieces to help infer which articles are fake (Castillo
et al., 2011; Jin et al., 2016), giving some promising early results. However, no prin-
cipled study is conducted on characterizing the users who are exposed to fake news
articles.
In this work, we extensively study the users who are exposed to fake news through
the lens of social media. As a subset of users who were exposed to fake news, we focus
on the ones who share the stories of those articles on Twitter due to the fact that it
is impossible to access all users who have read an online news article. We provide
a deep understanding of (i) what the characteristics of users who spread fake news
are; (ii) how well these features can discriminate users who spread fake news from the
ones who spread true news; (iii) how we can use the discriminative features of these
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users in the task of detecting fake news articles. We introduce a set of features with
foundations in social psychology and behavioral studies. Then we investigate to what
extent users who spread fake news and the ones who share real news are distinct in
terms of these features. Finally, we extend our study to the problem of detecting fake
news articles. To this end, we investigate the following hypothesis:
Do the users who spread fake news on social media show the same characteristics
as the fake news spreaders in traditional media as studied in the psychological theories?
5.1 Method
To understand the characteristics of users who spread fake news, we rely on psy-
chological theories on fake news, rumor, gossip, and conspiracies. All these concepts
share similarities such as recency and connection to current events, circulating in the
context of ambiguity, danger, or potential threat, and having major outbreaks during
main political events and natural disasters such as presidential elections and major
hurricanes (DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007). Although there is a large body of work on
these psychological theories, not many of them can be (1) applied to users and their
behaviors on social media and (2) quantitatively measured for fake news articles and
spreaders on social media. Hence, Based on psychological theories, we enumerate four
categories of features that can potentially express the differences between users who
spread fake news and the ones who spread real news. Then, we propose an approach
for measuring each on social media. We emphasize that the features we name in this
section are obtained from a wide range of physiological studies that goes beyond fake
news and we do not claim that all these factors are proven to have an effect in the
spread of fake news but potentially can. In the remainder of this section, we explain
these features and their theoretical origins.
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5.1.1 Motivational Factors
Based on an extensive study by DiFonzo and Bordia (DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007),
we list four factors that potentially affect the spread of fake news:
Uncertainty: spreading fake news can be a sense making activity in ambiguous
situations and the frequency of fake news increases in uncertain situations, such as
natural disasters or political events such as elections when people are unsure of the
results. When a crisis happens, people first seek information from official sources.
However, in the lack of such information, they form unofficial social networks to make
predictions with their own judgment and fill the information gap (Rosnow and Fine,
1976). This might result in generating fake news such as a fake image of a shark
swimming on the highways of Houston after Hurricane Harvey or millions of fake
news posts that were shared on Facebook in the weeks leading to the US presidential
election 2016.
Anxiety: emotional pressure can play an important role in spreading fake news
and can be triggered by emotions such as frustration, irritation, and anxiety. Anxi-
ety can make people more prone to spreading unproved claims and less accurate in
transmitting information (DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007). In high anxiety situations,
fake news can work as a justification process to relief emotional tension (Allport and
Postman, 1947). Fake news might be used as a method of expressing emotions in anx-
ious situations that allows people to talk about their concerns and receive feedback
informally; this process results in sense making and problem solving (Waddington,
2012). For example, during the devastating time of Hurricane Harvey, 2017, a fake
news story accusing Black Lives Matter supporters of blocking first responders reach-
ing the affected area was spread by more than one million Facebook users (Grenoble,
2017). Believing and spreading such fake news stories may help the people in disaster
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areas cope with the anxiety caused by delays in relief efforts (Fernandez et al., 2017).
Importance or outcome-relevance: people pursue uncertainty reduction only in the
areas that have personal relevance to them. For example, when a murder took place
in a university campus, rumor transmission in the people from the same campus was
twice the people who were from another university campus in the same city. Due to
the difficulty of measuring importance, anxiety is often used as a proxy; being anxious
about a fake news story shows importance (Anthony, 1973).
Lack of control: Fake news represents ways of coping with uncertain and uncon-
trollable situations. When people do not have primary control over their situation
(action-focused coping responses), they resort to secondary control strategies which
are emotional responses such as predicting the worst to avoid disappointment and at-
tributing events to chance. Two secondary control themes are explaining the meaning
of events and predicting future events.
Belief: building and maintaining social relations are vital to humans, hence, to
ensure their reputation as a credible source of information, they tend to share the
information in which they believe. Belief is found strongly related to transmission of
rumors. When it comes to political issues people tend to rationalize what they want
to believe instead of attempting to find the truth. Hence, persuading themselves
to believe what is aligned with their prior knowledge. This observation extends to
the limit that appending corrections to misleading claims may worsen the situation;
people who have believed the misleading claim may try to find reasons to dispute the
corrections to an extent that they will believe in the misleading claim even more than
before (Pennycook and Rand, 2019).
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5.1.2 Social Engagement
Allcott and GentzkowSocial (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017) studied different factors
that are correlated with belief in fake news. They found three correlations to be
statistically significant, one of which is how much time people spend consuming media.
Social media users engage more with social media were less likely to believe fake news
after the US presidential election in 2016. This observation indicates that users who
occasionally refer to social media for news consumption are at higher risk of being
impacted by fake news.
5.1.3 Position in the Network
In a study on workplace emails (Mitra and Gilbert, 2012), researchers observed
that employees with the lowest rank had a major contribution to the circulation of
information that is not confirmed to be true. Hence, we propose that the ranks of
social media users might affect how they react to fake news. There is not a unique
way of defining a rank for users on social media and lack of complete network infor-
mation, in most cases, limits our choices. Measures such as popularity or influence
are examples of rank indicators in social networks.
5.1.4 Relationship Enhancement
Enhancing social relations are one of the goals of spreading unverified informa-
tion (DiFonzo and Bordia, 2007) and conspiracies (Kou et al., 2017). In short term
social relations formation, with the purpose of generating a positive effect in others,
people may spread information to attract or hold attention without verifying its au-
thenticity. Also, in friendship relations, negative fake news might be transmitted as
a warning mechanism to provide the information that is relevant, useful, and pre-
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vents harmful consequences (Weenig et al., 2001). Another aspect of enhancing social
relations is using unverified information with self enhancement motivations such as
demoralizing enemy troops in war or downgrading the reputation of an opposing can-
didate in an election (Kapferer, 2013). If we consider follow relations on Twitter a
resemblance of friendship relations in the real world, the same mechanism might be
used by social media users to gain attention or warn the followers by spreading fake
news about the the presidential candidate they oppose to prevent harm that might be
caused by the election of them or gain more popularity for their favorite candidate.
Moreover, one of the motivations for sharing conspiracies is entertaining and initiat-
ing conversations. This behavior is observed in the form of expressing uncertainty
about the topic under discussion to build or shift the attention to other (opposing)
aspects (Kou et al., 2017).
5.2 Data
We use two datasets from FakeNewsNet repository (Shu et al., 2018) in explaining
our method (Section 5.4) and experiments (Section 5.5): PolitiFact and Gossip Cop.
PolitiFact2 is a fact-checking website operated by Tampa Bay Times3, where reporters
and editors from the media fact check the political news articles. The URLs of news
articles are available on the PolitiFact website and is used to collect the tweets related
to them. Gossip Cop4 is a website for fact-checking entertainment stories aggregated
from various media outlets. On Gossip Cop website, articles get a score between 0 and
10 as the degree from fake to real. However, URL or the headline of the articles are
not explicitly mentioned. Hence, some heuristics are used to find the headline of the
stories through Google search. When the headline of fake and real stories identified
2https://www.politifact.com/
3https://www.tampabay.com/
4https://www.gossipcop.com/
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by PolitiFact and Gossip Cop are extracted, a crawler collects all the tweets referring
to those stories. Further, recent posts, profile, and list of followers and friends of
Twitter users who posted about fake and real stories are collected. In this paper, we
limit our analysis to users who have at least 3 fake or real news to focus on users who
actively tweet news stories. The statistics of these two datasets is provided in Table
5.1.
Table 5.1: Statistics of he Datasets.
Dataset News Category Users News Tweets Timeline Tweets
PolitiFact
Real News 12,571 88,930 2,457,146
Fake News 6,330 45,184 1,241,317
Gossip Cop
Real News 2,831 134,055 555,457
Fake News 29,384 267,803 2,283,225
5.2.1 Feature Extraction
All the features introduced in Section 5.1 can be extracted from the content
(tweets), activity (tweeting behavior and likes), or network (followees and follow-
ers) of Twitter users in PolitiFact and Gossip Cop datasets. For measuring the fea-
tures that are extracted from content, we exploit Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count
(LIWC) (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). LIWC includes a dictionary that lists a
set of words for some psychologically-relevant categories such as positive and nega-
tive emotions, social relationships, and honesty and deception. For example, Positive
Emotions category includes words such as happy, pretty, and good. Each word can
belong to more than one category; for example, the word cried is part of five-word
categories: Sadness, Negative Emotion, Overall Affect, Verb, and Past Focus. To
measure a feature using an LIWC category, we find the percentage of words in a
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preprocessed tweet that belongs to that category. The preprocessing step includes
removing English stopwords, punctuations, URLs, hashtags, and mentions. Next, we
explain how each of the features is calculated:
• Motivational Factors: there are three LIWC categories that are related to uncer-
tainty: Discrepancy (e.g. should, would, and could), Tentativeness (e.g. maybe,
perhaps, and guess), and Certainty (e.g. always and never). These categories
are abbreviated as discrep, tentat, and certain respectively. Anxiety can be
measured using the LIWC Anxiety category (anx) which includes words such as
nervous, afraid, and tense. Importance or outcome-relevance is observed to be
a difficult feature to measure in psychology so researchers suggest using proxies
to quantify importance; we use anxiety as a proxy for measuring this feature,
meaning that people are more anxious about a topic which is more important
to them. We use LIWC Future Focus (futurefocus) to measure lack of control,
this category includes words such as may, will, and soon. We do not measure
belief explicitly because we assume that any user who tweets fake news articles
believes in it.
• Social Engagement: the more a user is involved with social media the less likely
it is for her/him to be misguided by fake news. We measure social engagement
on Twitter using the average number of tweets per day.
• Position in the Network: this feature can be quantified using a variety of metrics
when the network structure is known. However, in the case of social networks
between Twitter users, we do not have complete structure and even collecting
local information is time consuming due to the rate limitation of Twitter APIs.
Hence, we extract influence using the number of followees and popularity using
the number of followers of each user.
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• Relationship Enhancement: improving the relation to other social media users
and gaining more attention from the community is one of the motivations for
spreading fake news. If the number of retweets and likes of a fake news post is
higher than the average number of retweets, likes and of the spreader, it can
indicate that this user has enhanced their social relation and initiated conver-
sation. Hence, we use the difference between the number of retweets and likes
of fake news posts and average values for each user as indicators of relationship
enhancement motivation.
The summary of features and the metrics used to measure them is presented in
Table 5.2. Based on this list we extract eleven features in four categories for each
user in our datasets.
Table 5.2: Summary of the Metrics Used to Measure Features of Users Who Spread
Fake News.
Feature Feature
Metric
Example
Category Name Words
Motivational Factors
Tentativeness LIWC tentat maybe, perhaps
Discrepancy LIWC discrep should, would
Certainty LIWC certain always, never
Anxiety LIWC anx worried, fearful
Lack of Control LIWC focusfuture may, will, soon
Social Engagement Social Engagement Avg Tweets per Day -
Position in the Network
Influence #Folowees -
Popularity #Followers -
Relationship Enhancement
Boosting #Retweets Increase in Retweets -
Boosting #Likes Increase in Likes -
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5.3 Experiments
We show the power of our proposed method in terms of (1) how it can be used in
discriminating fake news spreaders from real news spreaders and (2) how this can be
used in detecting fake news content.
5.4 Fake News vs. Real News Spreader
We study the differences between users who spread fake news and the ones who
spread real news in terms of four feature categories introduced in Section 5.1. We
perform two experiments toward this goal. First, we set the null hypothesis is that
these two groups have the same mean in four categories of features. If the results
of T-test shows that there is a significant difference (p-value less than 0.05) between
two groups, we can reject the null hypothesis. Second, we use the proposed features
to see if a supervised model (a classifier) can use these features to discriminate the
two groups of users.
As shown in Table 5.3, in the Motivational Factors category, we observe a signif-
icant difference (p-value < 0.005) between users who share fake news and the ones
who share real news in terms of all features except Anxiety. We believe one reason
for this observation is that Gossip Cop articles are mostly concerned with celebrity
news and regardless of the true or false nature of the news being propagated, the
news has a low potential of causing distress or being propagated to address anxiety
in the spreader. On the other hand, Politifact contains news article about a variety
of topics, including natural disasters and politics. Hence, there is more potential for
these articles to be circulated due to the anxiety of the spreader.
In social engagement, Politifact users who share fake news have significantly lower
number of tweets per day but we do not observe a significant difference among users
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in the Gossip Cop users. We used the Influence (number of followees) and popularity
(number of followers) as indicators of the status in the network. Except for the
Influence in the Politifact users, we observe a significant difference among users who
spread real news and the ones spreading fake news. We also expected to see different
number of likes and retweets for the fake news tweets which is only observed in
reshares feature; indicating that Boosting #Likes can be a motivation for spreading
fake news on social media.
Table 5.3: Comparison Between Fake News and Real News Spreaders in Terms of
Psychological Features. The Features That Are Significantly Different Between Users
Who Spread Fake News and the Ones Who Spread Reals News Are Marked With **
(p-value <0.005) or * (p-value <0.05)
Feature Feature t-statistic t-statistic
Category Name Politifact Gossip Cop
Motivational Factors
Tentativeness -21.62** 14.44**
Discrepancy -13.55** 10.94**
Certainty -7.65** 13.15**
Anxiety -2.05* 0.94
Lack of Control -3.96** 13.34**
Social Engagement Social Engagement -13.16** -0.41
Position in the Network
Influence -0.26 2.74**
Popularity -2.69* 2.10*
Relationship Enhancement
Boosting #Retweets -3.78** 9.70**
Boosting #Likes -1.54 -0.70
5.5 Predictive Power of Psychological Features in Fake News Detection
In this section, we shift our focus from the users who spread fake news to the
news articles; we test the predictive power of these features in detecting fake news
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articles on social media. We use a supervised method to classify news articles into
fake and real. Each news article is represented by an 11-dimensional vector based on
psychological and social features. The vector for each article is the mean of vectors
for all the users who have tweeted about that article and have at least three fake or
real news tweets. We test classifiers, Random Forest, Decision Tree, and SVM, to
show the classification results. We measure the performance in terms of Precision,
Recall, F1 Score, Accuracy, and ROC AUC.
As shown in Table 5.4, Random Forest has the highest accuracy and ROC AUC.
Accuracy indicates that using these features, 81% and 84% of fake and real news
articles in Politifact and Gossip Cop, respectively, are correctly labeled. Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is created by plotting the true positive rate
against the false positive rate at various threshold settings. The Area Under Curve
(AUC) and ROC curve is used as a measure of sensitivity (the most sensitive classifier
has no false negative with AUC equal to one) and is equal to 0.5 for random guess
classifier. Using the features proposed in this work, we reach 0.91 and 0.93 ROC
AUC for Politifact and Gossip Cop datasets respectively. The Precision, Recall, and
F1 Score reported in Table 5.4, indicate the performance of the classifier incorrectly
labeling the fake news articles. In the Politifact dataset, 84% of the articles labeled
as fake news are correctly labeled and 81% of all the fake news articles are found by
the classifier. In the Gossip Cop dataset, these values are 91% and 81% respectively.
In Section 5.4, we presented how the users who spread fake news tweet are sig-
nificantly different from the ones who spread real news tweets in terms of the four
categories of features. Here, we discuss the role of these features in detecting fake
news articles using the features of their spreaders on Twitter. Using the feature im-
portance in the Decision Tree Classifier that labels articles as fake or real (Table 5.5),
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Table 5.4: Performance of the Psychological Features in Detecting Unobserved Fake
News.
Metric
Politifact Gossip Cop
REFOCUS Random Decision SVM REFOCUS Random Decision SVM
Forest Tree Forest Tree
Precision 0.73 0.84 0.80 0.77 0.76 0.91 0.89 0.83
Recall 0.98 0.81 0.83 0.70 0.97 0.81 0.89 0.70
F1 Score 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.73 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.76
ROC AUC 0.93 0.91 0.79 0.79 0.94 0.93 0.87 0.82
we observe that the most important features for both datasets are in the relationship
enhancement category. This observation is an indicator that tweeting about fake
news on social media can be due to the motivation of gaining more attention from
social circles via collecting likes and retweets.
If we compare the non-significant features in Tables 5.3 and 5.5, we observe that
all those features have a low importance in detecting fake news articles except the
Table 5.5: Importance of Features in Detecting Fake News Articles. the Results
Are Feature Importance Scores Generated by a Decision Tree Classifier for Labeling
Articles as Fake or Real Using the Proposed Features.
Feature Category Feature Name Feature Weight Feature Weight
Politifact Gossip Cop
Motivational Factors
Tentativeness 0.09 0.05
Discrepency 0.12 0.07
Centainty 0.06 0.07
Anxiety 0.05 0.05
Lack of Control 0.02 0.11
Social Engagement Social Engagement 0.03 0.12
Position in the Network
Influence 0.03 0.02
Popularity 0.07 0.03
Relationship Enhancement
Boosting #Retweets 0.06 0.34
Boosting #Likes 0.42 0.05
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Increase in Likes for the Politifact dataset and Average Tweets per Day for the Gossip
Cop dataset that have the highest and the second highest importance. This is an
interesting observation that shows, although these two features are not the most
significant features when focusing on the user who spread news, they still play an
important role when we take into consideration all the users who spread one piece of
news to label it as fake or real.
5.6 Summary
In this work, we investigated whether the psychological features that are observed
in users who spread fake news in the behavioral studies on human subjects are valid
for social media users who spread fake news on social media. Toward this goal, we
introduce four categories of features based on psychological theories that can be quan-
tified for social media users. Based on our observations on two real-world datasets, we
observed that (i) social media users who spread fake news are significantly different
in terms of the majority of these features and (ii) these features have predictive power
in the detecting new and unobserved fake news articles.
This study is a first step towards understanding users who are exposed to fake
news. We wish to continue this work by collecting a larger set of psychological fea-
tures such as personality traits and study them on news consumers on social media.
Moreover, we plan to study the application of the psychological features in improving
the performance of state-of-the-art fake news detection algorithms.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this chapter, we conclude the dissertation with enumerating our methodological
contributions and also our future directions.
6.1 Methodological Contributions
The contributions of our work throughout this dissertation is summarized as fol-
lows:
1. Understanding Disasters through the Lens of Social Media: I intro-
duced my studies on social media after major disasters in Chapter 3. I first
extracted the socio-temporal stages of disasters during which the users provide
a large number of posts on social media. This abundance of information is
necessary for Machine Learning models to perform well. Then, I proposed a
supervised model to filter actionable tweets from all millions of tweets that are
posted after major disasters. A contribution of our work is we used the context
(meta data of tweets such as URLs, hastags, and user profiles) along with the
content. Context is more accessible and less expensive to process but it also
provides a strong signal regarding the type of tweet (actionable or not).
2. Understanding Bots who Spread Malicious Content: in Chapter 4, I
provided the details of two bot detection methods that we proposed. Both
of these methods are supervised models that aim at optimizing the recall of
the classification task while maintaining a high overall performance. The main
contribution of our models is focusing on recall as opposed to the majority
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of the previous studies. A bot detection model that has a high recall, helps
clean social media datasets from non-human actors and also prevent users from
interacting with bots.
• BoostOR: our first attempt (Section 4.2.2 in introducing a recall-focused
approach is called BoostOR. This method is a variation of AdaBoost clas-
sifier in which we change the weights of the misclassified instances in every
iteration. The main different between BoostOR and AdaBoost is that we
only increase the weight of misclassified bots, hence, the classifier is pe-
nalized more if it misclassifies bots. As a results we achieve higher recall
on real-world datasets and outperform other algorithms in overall perfor-
mance (F1score).
• REFOCUS: in our second attempt (Section 4.2.3), we looked at the prob-
lem of bot detection from a new perspective. We proposed a method that
given a dataset and a based classifier finds the sweet spot between precision
and recall at which we have high recall without sacrificing the overall per-
formance. We showed that using F2 score during the training phase helps
us find the best classification threshold to achieve our goal. Moreover, our
overall performance in terms of F1 score is similar to the state-of-the-art
bot detection methods on real-world datasets.
3. Understanding Users who are Affected by Malicious Content: bots,
especially if generated in large numbers, can significantly increase the visibility
and reach of malicious content on social media. However, without benign users
(i.e. human users) who believe and reshare this malicious content, the spread
cannot be viral. In Chapter 5, we studied the uses who helped spread malicious
content on social media. We introduced five categories of features based on
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psychological theories to understand the characteristics of these users. These
features helped us understand what motivates users to spread malicious content.
We also, studied the potential of these features in detecting fake news.
6.2 Future Directions
1. Fake News in Disasters: An application of Machine Learning models is de-
tecting actionable posts in the aftermath of disasters. An underlying assump-
tion of such models is that the social media posts are generated by legitimate
users and are not intentionally false. However, there are at least two scenarios
in which this assumption is not valid: (1) when the posts are generated by
malicious actors such as bots or (2) when posts contain false information such
as fake content. A situation which falls into these scenarios is when a users
posts a “fake” help-seeking tweet. These tweets can be very similar in content
and structure to the help-seeking of legitimate users in need and it makes fil-
tering them even more difficult. We believe that exploiting more features from
the users, beside the content, can help improve the Machine Learning models
designed for this task. Examples of such features are profiles of users, their
coordination with other users, and also positing behaviors.
2. Discovering Types of Bots on Social Media: alighted with the majority of
studies on social bots, we proposed methods to distinguish bots from humans.
Our methods, although look at this problem from a new perspective, they do not
have the capability to dissect bots into their types. Different types of bots have
been observed on social media: Duplicate Spammers, Duplicate @ Spammers,
Malicious Promoters, and Friend Infiltrators. But, developing methods to detect
these types remains overlooked. We believe that semi-supervised models can
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be a fit to this problem; an supervised model to find botnets (clusters of bots)
and a supervised model to find which type of bot each botnet is.
3. Evolution of Bots over Time: An study in 2011 (Lee et al., 2011) shows that
bots have at least four categories. Since 2011, bots have evolved significantly
and became extremely more difficult to detect. These malicious actors have
been active during major events such as the the 2016 US Presidential Election
and are expected to be as destructive in the 2020 US Presidential Election.
Hence, it is important to understand how different types of bots have evolved
since that study. An understudied problem in the area of bot detection is
understanding how bots evolve over time. It is difficult to observe how the
characteristics of a fixed set of bots change as many of them are banned by the
regulators. However, we can study the distribution of the known types of bots
across events and over time. Moreover, it is interesting to see what new types
of bots are generates especially during major events such as as elections and
natural crises.
4. Exploiting Psychological Features of Users in Detecting Fake News:
our studies in Chapter 3 showed that users who spread malicious content, es-
pecially fake news in our study, have different psychological features. This
finding shed light on the motivations and characteristics of these users. It is
valuable to study how we can incorporate user features in a fake news detection
method. Majority of fake news detection approaches use the content or user
profile features. Hence, users’ psychological features are a valuable addition
towards improving the fake news detection models.
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APPENDIX A
TWEETTRACKER
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TweetTracker (Kumar et al., 2011) is a system for tracking, analyzing, and un-
derstanding tweets related to a specific topic:
• Tracking: to track the status of an event, data can be collected using a set of
criteria including keywords, location, and users. The source of the data can be
chosen from Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, VK, and Instagram. See Figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Tracking Hurricane Sandy, 2012, on TweetTracker.
• Analyzing: changes in the total number of post or frequency of posts with
specific words can be plotted for different time periods. Moreover, keywords,
hashtags, links, images, and videos with their frequencies are available to the
user. See Figure A.2.
Figure A.2: Analyzing Hurricane Sandy Dataset on TweetTracker.
• Understanding: to better understand the geographic distribution of posts on
the globe, the posts which are geotagged will be shown on a map. See Figure
A.3.
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Figure A.3: Understanding the Discussion About Hurricane Sandy Using Tweet-
Tracker.
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APPENDIX B
HONEYPOT METHOD FOR GROUND TRUTH COLLECTION
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Social honeypots for tracking malicious actors on social media were introduced in
2008 by Webb, Caverlee, and Pu (Webb et al., 2008). They constructed 51 honeypot
profiles and associated them with distinct geographic locations in MySpace which was
a popular social networking community at the time. They collected 1,570 spamming
profiles during a four-month evaluation period. The characteristics of these honeypots
are as follows:
• To capture the geographic artifacts of spamming behaviors, each honeypot ac-
count was associated with the most populated city in a US state.
• Except for their geographical locations, all honeypots share identical profile
features: same relationship status (single), body type (athletic), and ethnicity
(White / Caucasian).
• They passively wait for malicious users to send them a friend request, collect
the profile information of the spammer, and reject the request to avoid be-
ing associated with malicious actors and consequently being banned from the
network.
In a honeypot method, all the users who interact with a honeypot are considered
as bots/spammers/content polluters. Off course any user who follows or messages a
honeypot account is not necessarily a bot. However, honeypots post random content
and do not engage in any interactions like normal users would. Hence, there is no
point for legitimate users to interact with honeypots and this makes the assumption
of honeypots reasonable. Lee (Lee et al., 2011) that we can safely assume that the
probability of a users mistakenly interacting with a honeypot is similar, if not less
that, the probability of making a mistake in a manual annotation of social media
users. So, the honeypot method is expected to be as trustworthy as a ground-truth
collection method based on manual annotation.
Using honeypots for understanding bots on social media has multiple advan-
tages (Lee et al., 2011): (1) we can automatically collect data on these malicious
actors without manual annotation by human experts; (2) the data collection process
and monitoring can be performed without inference in the normal activities of legiti-
mate users; (3) as bots change their strategies, honeypots can be modified accordingly
to capture and monitor them. Having access to the profiles of a large number of ma-
licious users and monitoring their activities over time yields to interesting findings
such as:
• Malicious actors were most active the day before, the day of, and the day
after Columbus Day, Halloween, and Thanksgiving. Authors hypothesize that
legitimate users are expected to be highly active on these days and provide a
larger audience for spammers to lure.
• Users in the Midwest states received more spamming friend request. One expla-
nation is that these states started using MySpace later that users in the Western
states and are less “MySpace-savvy” and hence more prone to be manipulated
by the malicious actors.
• Malicious actors send large number of friend requests in short periods of time
(bursty activity) and target users in diverse geographic locations.
105
Webb (Webb et al., 2008) found five categories of malicious actors among the
spammers that were collected by their honeypots:
1. Click Traps have deceptive profiles and direct MySpace users to nefarious web-
sites.
2. Friend Infiltrators try to connect as many users as possible. Once the friendship
connection is established, they use available communications channels to spam
the target users.
3. Pornographic Storytellers have and “About me” section that consists of ran-
domized pornographic stories, usually with links leading to pornographic web
pages.
4. Japanese Pill Pushers promote sales of pills with intriguing examples and pic-
tures of previous customers.
5. Winnies are a set of profiles whose bios all start with “Hey its winnie.” and
direct users to pornographic web pages.
In another attempt on using honeypots to study malicious actors on social media,
Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee (Lee et al., 2011) used honeypots to collect and understand
content polluters on Twitter. They deployed 60 Twitter honeypots that were active
for 7 months and collected 23,869 polluters. These honeypots do not interact with
legitimate users. They use the mention mechanism, @username, between themselves
and tweets regularly to remain active in the network. They publish four types of
tweets : (1) a normal textual tweet; (2) an “@” reply to one of the other social
honeypots; (3) a tweet containing a link; (4) a tweet containing one of Twitter’s
current Top 10 trending topics, which are popular n-grams. Some of the findings of
this study is described bellow:
• The honeypot method can capture twitter bots much earlier that the official
Twitter suspension mechanism. Lee et al. observed that 77% of bots were never
suspended by Twitter and among the ones that were, some lived for 204 days
before being banned.
• Malicious users had, on average, higher number of followers and followings.
They followed 2,123 accounts, and the average number of followers they had
was 2,163. These numbers are higher than most legitimate users which only
have between 100 and 1,000 followers and following counts.
• Bots post an average of four tweets per day to mimic the activity patterns of
legitimate users and avoid the Twitter’s suspension mechanism.
• Content polluters have more fluctuations in their network. One possible ex-
planation is that bots try to maintain balance between the number peoples
they follow and the number of users who follow them back. Hence, they might
unfollow the users who did not follow them to add other users to their network.
Similar to the study on MySpace (Webb et al., 2008), Lee analyzed the bots they
collected and categorized them into four groups:
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1. Duplicate Spammers post identical tweets.
2. Duplicate @ Spammers target random legitimate users and send identical tweets
to them, similar to Duplicate Spammers.
3. Malicious Promoters advertise online business, marketing, finance and so on.
4. Friend Infiltrators try to gain many followers by following a large number of
users and hoping they reciprocate. When they reach a large audience, they
engage in spamming activities.
Both of the studies mentioned so far (Webb et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2011) create
general purpose honeypots and then analyze the lured malicious actors to find cluster
structure in them. Morstatter et al. (Morstatter et al., 2016), however, exploited
the honeypot approach in a new way. The idea is that if we control the content
and behavior of our honeypots, we can lure a specific group of bots in the wild.
Specifically they aim to collect bots that spread the content aligned with the ideas of
Arab Extremists on Twitter.
To collect this dataset, they constructed a honeypot network. This network con-
sists of 9 accounts controlled automatically by a single controller. Each account tweets
messages containing Arabic phrases identified by a subject matter expert pertaining
to a specific group of people. Each account also randomly follows other honeypots
in our network. Since bots have a lower chance of forming social ties (Thomas et al.,
2011), they performed this random following process to lower the chance that our ac-
counts are deleted by Twitter’s automatic account removal algorithm. Additionally,
each honeypot can randomly retweet one of the other honeypots it follows in order
to give that honeypot prominence on the network and lower its probability of being
deleted due to Twitter’s policies.
All of the bots in this honeypot dataset behave identically, as dictated by the
controller. Each bot collects tweets using the selected Arabic phrases from Twitter’s
Streaming API. At random time intervals, the bot either copies the tweet, passing it
off as its own, or retweets it from the user who originally posted it. The full logic for
the honeypot controller is shown in Algorithm 3. Using a network of 9 honeypots, they
considered all followers of the honeypots to be bots: due to the way these honeypots
behave, no normal user would follow them (Lee et al., 2011). With this approach
they collected 3,602 active bot accounts who followed one of the honeypot accounts.
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while True do
Randomly choose one honeypot, h;
r ←− random number ∈ [1, 10];
if r = 1 then
h retweets the most recent tweet from another randomly-selected
honeypot;
end
else
Sample tweets from Twitter Streaming API for 20 seconds, filtering
based on Arabic phrases, call sample set S;
r ←− random number ∈ [1, 10];
s←− randomly-selected tweet from S;
if r < 3 then
h retweets s;
end
else
h copies s and tweets it word-for-word;
end
end
Wait 10 seconds;
end
Algorithm 3: Logic for Honeypot Controller. the Controller Manages the Hon-
eypot Accounts Used to Collect Bots in the Wild. All Randomly-Generated Num-
bers Mentioned in the Pseudocode Are Generated Uniformly at Random.
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